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This paper examines the effect(s) of interlocking boards on the outcomes of merger and 
acquisition transactions in Canada.  Among the most significant results of this paper is 
evidence indicating that merger deals with an interlocking relationship, i.e. having one or 
more shared directors between the transacting firms, results in higher cumulative 
abnormal returns the target and acquiring firms.  Merging firms with interlocking 
directorates were found to be more successful during the merger process, have a higher 
likelihood of transacting with cash, and have a significantly higher frequency of toeholds 
as well as higher toehold percentage ownership.  This paper also presents a brief snapshot 
of the Canadian market for corporate control by documenting various firm and board 
characteristics, such as firm size, the fraction of inside, outside, grey and female directors 
serving on the average sample firm, as well as the average tenure of directors, and the 
average amount of share ownership held by directors, as well as how these characteristics 
influence the likelihood of interlocks between firms.  A higher than average number of 
women and grey directors were found to have significantly positive effect on the 
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Interlocking directorates are a potent and visible sign of corporate relationship 
networks.  In fact, one could label them the archetypal representation of professional 
interconnections.  Formally defined, interlocking directorates (or directorships) are 
created when an individual simultaneously holds a board position with two or more 
different corporations.  A broader definition of interlocking directorates takes into 
account the notion that an interlock is created even when an individual does not hold two 
board memberships concurrently; rather it occurs when an individual holds a position on 
one firm’s board while simultaneously someone who is very close to this individual (for 
example a family member, an executive officer of the firm on whose board this individual 
sits, or a professional contact such as a law partner or business partner) holds a seat on 
another firm’s board.  Thus, interlocks can be either direct interlocks, where the same 
person holds board seats on separate firms’ boards, or indirect interlocks, where two 
closely connected and / or related individuals hold seats on different firms’ boards. 
The goal of this thesis is to contribute to the further understanding of the effects of 
interlocking directorates; more specifically – how do interlocking directorates affect the 
value creation, or destruction, during a merger and / or acquisition process.  In this thesis 
we focus on the impact of direct interlocks as these relationships are expected to have the 
strongest impact on firm behaviour. Due to its structural characteristics, such as its 
relatively small pool of directors, large number of firms, and accommodating regulatory 
environment, the Canadian M&A market was chosen as the object of study.  As such, the 
sample of study used in this thesis was composed exclusively of the Canadian business 
entities. 
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Among the most significant results of this paper is evidence indicating that merger 
deals with an interlocking board relationship result in higher shareholder wealth creation 
as measured by the cumulative abnormal returns.  Furthermore, the existence of an 
interlocking relationship has also been found to be a significant toe-hold between the 
merging entities. This paper also presents a brief snap shot of the Canadian market for 
corporate control by documenting the characteristics of Canadian boards and how these 
characteristics influence the existence of interlocks.  A higher average number of women 
and grey directors were found to have significantly positive effects on the existence of 
interlocks, and, surprisingly, large firm size had the reverse effect.  Firms with 
interlocking directorates were found to be more successful during the merger process, 
have a higher likelihood of transacting with cash, and have significantly higher 
occurrences of toeholds as well as higher toehold percentage ownership. 
 The paper begins by detailing the motivation behind the thesis topic. Next, a 
review of the literature is presented – specifically detailing the difference between the 
inter-organizational and intra-class approaches to studying interlocks. Based on this 
literature, the testable hypotheses are developed and presented.  The data and sample 
collection process is then described, followed by the presentation of the paper’s results 
and a discussion of their interpretations.  Finally, the conclusions of this paper are 
discussed and recommendations for future research are presented. 
II. Research Motivation 
As previously mentioned, this study focuses on how interlocking directorates affect 
the value creation, or destruction, during a merger and / or acquisition in Canada. The 
Canadian market was chosen as the object of study due to its regulatory and structural 
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characteristics, which allow for the existence of interlocking boards among its corporate 
entities.  However, in choosing to conduct this study within the Canadian capital market, 
four of this market’s most prominent characteristics, discussed below, had to be taken 
into consideration due to their expected positive and negative effects on thesis outcomes 
and data collection process. 
First, and most significant for this thesis, Canadian capital markets are noted for their 
centralization, or perhaps more appropriately, the pooling of control among a relatively 
small number of firms with respect to the total number available in the market.  To 
illustrate, the 100 largest Canadian firms comprise more than 70% of the total market 
capitalization, and less than 20% of the largest firms on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
account of 85% of the exchange’s market capitalization (Nicholls, 2006, p. 154).  This 
characteristic should contribute to a higher frequency of observing interlocking-
directorates among all firms in general, and more specifically those taking part in merger 
and acquisition activity.  
The second significant characteristic of the Canadian capital market is that in spite of 
existing in the second largest nation, in km
2
, it is very small compared to other developed 
nations' financial markets.  Nicholls (2006) cites statistics from the World Federation of 
Exchanges (2004 data) showing that  
...the total market capitalization of Canada’s stock exchanges was about US$1.178 
trillion, whereas the total market capitalization for all WFE exchanges was about 
US$37.168 trillion during the same period. Thus, Canada’s markets constituted about 
3.17% of total market capitalization worldwide. To put this number in perspective, the 
NYSE’s market capitalization as of 2004 was US$12.708 trillion (34.19%), the 
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American Stock Exchange’s market capitalization was US$83.302 billion (0.22%), 
NASDAQ’s market capitalization was US$3.533 trillion (9.51%), the London Stock 
Exchange’s market capitalization was US$2.865 trillion (7.71%), and the Deutsche 
Borse’s market capitalization was US$1.195 trillion (3.22%).(149) 
As such, the problem of thin or no-trading data for many firms is a problem when dealing 
with research based solely in Canada.  Lack of trading data is expected to be a major 
hurdle during the data collection process of this paper. 
Third, despite Canada’s size, its capital markets are under-represented on the world 
stage, relative to smaller sized nations.  However, inversely, the number of firms that 
exist within Canada is relatively large. According to Nicholls (2006) there are 
approximately 3,500-4,000 publicly traded firms in Canada (as of December 31, 2005).  
That value increases to a total of 2 million when adding all the non-traded firms.  The 
number of firms existing will aid in the data collection process required for this thesis as 
is it expected to increase the likelihood of observing an interlocking relationship between 
firms involved in a merger and / or acquisition transaction.  In addition, this characteristic 
will help mitigate the issues regarding thin or no-trading data mentioned earlier. 
Lastly, an interesting attribute of the Canadian capital market is that the majority of 
firms are privately held.  In addition the Canadian market is heavily influenced by firms 
operating in natural resources and the financing (mainly banking), with over 65% of 
TSX’s market capitalization being owned by firms within the Oil and Gas, Financial 
Services and the Mining Sector.  Indeed, the sample on which this paper’s research was 
conducted was overwhelmingly (≈ 67% of all deals) made up of firms operating directly 
in the natural resource market.  This attribute will, of course, hinder the data collection 
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process, as private firms do not publish the board composition data required by this 
thesis.  However, this set back is somewhat mitigated by virtue of the relatively large 
number of firms existing in Canada, as noted previously.  As such, it is the combination 
of these four main characteristics that make Canada the ideal locale in which to conduct 
this study on the effects of interlocks during M&A transactions. 
III. Literature 
i. Inter-Organizational versus Intra-Class Analysis of Interlocks 
The subject of interlocking boards is a topic that often provokes heated discussion 
among both academics as well as legislators because of the potential that interlocking 
boards have to being tools that facilitate management agency problems (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976).  However, interlocking directors, as all directors in general, also have 
the potential to be agents of shareholder wealth maximization due to the guidance, 
leadership, and experience they can provide to a firm’s management.  According to 
Donald Palmer “interlocks have been studied from two different but compatible 
perspectives”, which are referred to as the inter-organizational and the intra-class 
approaches (Palmer, 1983, p. 40).  Within the context of Palmer’s work, the inter-
organizational aspect of board interlocks is akin to the aforementioned shareholder 
wealth-maximization potential, whereas the intra-class approach is the study of the 
agency driven aspects of interlocks. 
Palmer’s reference to inter-organizational study of interlocks relates to the study of 
how firms, as individual entities in and of themselves, have social and professional 
interests and actually encourage the existence of interlocks in order to create and nurture 
relationships with other firms in order to learn.  In this context, the interlocking 
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directorate, the board seat itself and the person who occupies it, is viewed as evidence of 
the relationship between otherwise independent firms.  The men and women who occupy 
these positions are the conduits through which this relationship is exchanged and 
expressed.  According to Dooly (1969), Allen (1974), Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), Burt 
(1979), and Palmer (1983), the interlocking relationship provide its participants, the two 
or more interlocked firms, with a variety of advantages, not the least of which is the 
ability, or in some cases the mere opportunity, to share information; access to this scarce 
and valuable resource thereby enables each party to formulate and apply respective 
competitive strategies more effectively.  Palmer, citing Blair (1976) expands further on 
the “benefits” of interlocking directorates by stating that these relationships  
...may even provide the basis for tacit forms of inter-organizational coordination, such 
as anticompetitive price setting [and] interlock ties may also allow partners to 
influence one another's board-level policies, thus providing the basis for stronger 
forms of inter-organizational coordination. (40) 
As a caveat, Palmer (1983) proposes that if this inter-organizational linkage is “based 
solely on the commitments of the interlocking director(s) to the members of the two 
boards on which he or she sits, coordination will crystallize or dissolve as situations 
change” (p. 40).  This means that if the interlocking relationship is driven by the 
individual director’s personal objectives (be they social, professional or otherwise) rather 
the objectives firms he/she represents then the effects of the interlocking relationship on 
the interlocked firms, whatever they maybe, will only be secondary to the outcomes 
desired by the individual director that holds that interlocking position.  
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As such, the inter-class view of interlocking directorates and their impact on inter 
corporate dynamics argues that “individuals within the capitalist class or business elite 
are actors who possess interests. Organizations are the agents of these actors.  In pursuit 
of their interests, capitalists establish relationships with other capitalists” (Domhoff 1967, 
1971, and Roy 1981).  In this definition, the interlocking relationship is established to 
serve the requirements and ambitions of the directors themselves as opposed to being a 
tool used by the organization to advance their own social and competitive goals.  
According to Koenig and Gogel (1981) the over-arching result of director intentions that 
result in overlapping boards, may be termed “the social network.”  Given that the 
development and nurturing of this social network is the initial reason why particular 
directors choose to take on the responsibility of sitting on various corporate boards, 
Palmer argues that the significance of the interlocking relationships to the organizations 
themselves can then be divided into two categories.  First, firms who have one or more of 
their directors sitting on other boards can exploit these interlocking relationships by 
attempting to dictate the nature of the relationship itself – whether it will exist at all, and 
if so to what extent – only if the interlocked director(s)’ principle allegiance is to that said 
firm.  This way, organizations can then control the amount and type of information shared 
between the interlocking director(s) and the social networks.  A prominent, and relatively 
recent
1
, example of firms dictating the nature of an interlocking relationship occurred 
when Google CEO Eric Schmidt resigned his board seat at Apple Inc., with mutual 
consent, citing rising conflict of interests after Google launched a competing web 
browser to one already made by Apple.  Even though it is claimed that Schmidt would 
leave portions of Apple’s board meetings when the topic of Google was discussed, 
                                                          
1
 August 3, 2009 
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Google’s foray further into markets already occupied by Apple meant that he had to 
sequester himself further from board meetings. Finally, the decision was made that the 
interlocking relationship, however carefully monitored, allowed too much information to 
be potentially pass from one firm to another.  Thus Google recalled its CEO from Apple’s 
board, and thus inevitably put an end to the interlocked relationship.  Second, given that 
the director(s)’ primary concerns instead lie towards the interests and / or activities within 
the various social groups they belong to outside their organizations, the benefits of the 
interlocking directorship may not be observed directly by the organizations on which 
these individuals serve as board members.  Instead, the interlocking directorships  
...will direct interaction and the communication of techniques, values, and 
beliefs between directors, thereby generating a common business elite or 
capitalist class culture that guides managerial behaviour, socializes new 
directors into this culture, and socially controls deviant managerial behaviour. 
As such director's prominence and power within the business elite or capitalist 
class depends on his or her position in the social network, and not on their 
position in any one particular firm. (Palmer 42) 
This phenomenon is referred to by Kenig and Gogel (1981) as the hegemony model of 
the intra-class approach to studying interlocks.  In essence, directors’ own social 
networking will indirectly help the firms he / she are associated with by virtue of the 
bond created during social networking.  This social familiarity between directors, it is 
argued, will facilitate communication and interaction within a business context. 
Alternatively, several authors such as Zeitlin, Ratcliff, and Ewen (1974), Useem 
(1978) and (1979), and Ratcliff (1980) have suggested the “inner group centrality” 
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argument, which focuses on the number of board seats directors hold as indicators 
prominence and / or power, whilst others like Soref (1980) look to whether directors hold 
board seats at financial institutions, thereby measuring their “finance capitalist status” 
(Palmer, 1980, p. 42).  In addition, Palmer argues that directors’ status within the 
corporate board social network, is inherently affected by their status in other social 
groups such as private club membership, government association etc. (Palmer, 1983, p. 
42).  This is a crucial point to make since it can be assumed that directors’ relationships 
and interactions outside the context of their professional positions will undoubtedly affect 
the interactions they have, or will have, within their professional environment.  
Ultimately, the culmination of these interactions, whether they are value increasing or 
decreasing, will be borne by the shareholders.  This is why corporate directorships are 
studied with such intent. 
Using both the “inter-organizational” and the "intra-class" theories lead to the notion 
that interlocks serve to mitigate inter-organizational differences and enhance interactions.  
Penning (1983) commented on this, saying; 
...compared with interlocking directorates, mergers are a very radical and 
thorough solution to the problems associates with the management of inter-
organizational relationships.  Vertical integration resolves the transactional 
difficulties by harmonizing the interest of two previously adversary firms.  By 
grouping two firms into a single organization, transactional haggling, 
opportunism, and uncertainty that contaminate buyer-seller relationships are 
circumvented.  Indeed, the new firm ensures more complete, accessible and 
undistorted information among the previously transactionally interdependent 
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partners and partially removes the uncertainty so that they obtain more complete 
control over the environment.  It also removes the need for costly contract 
negotiations and renewals, and for the enforcement of the 
agreements…Horizontal [competitive] merges may accrue benefits for the 
participating organizations because mergers may alter the market structure or 
because they perform an intelligence function from the organizations involved. 
(pages 110-111) 
In so much as interlocks appear to facilitate the sharing of information between firms 
they are almost prohibited from existing in the United States.  The 1914 Clayton Act
2
 
effectively limits interlocking directorates, but does not outlaw it specifically. In fact, 
Louis Brandeis, one of President Woodrow Wilson’s chief advisors on trust problems 
described interlocking directorates as  
...the root of many evils. It offends laws human and divine. Applied to rival 
corporations, it tends to the suppression of competition and to violation of the 
Sherman Act
3
. Applied to corporations which deal with each other, it tends to 
disloyalty and to violation of the fundamental law that no man can serve two 
masters. In either event it leads to inefficiency; for it removes incentive and 
destroys soundness of judgment. It is undemocratic, for it rejects the platform: “A 
fair field and no favours,"-substituting the pull of privilege for the push of 
manhood (Dooley 314) 
In stark contrast to section 8 of the aforementioned Clayton Act, which specifically 
“prohibits a person from serving as a director, or a board-appointed officer, of two or 
                                                          
2
 The Clayton Act addresses to topic of price discrimination, mergers and acquisitions, exclusive dealings, 
and interlocking directorates; enacted in 1914. 
3
 The Sherman Act addresses the subject of agreements and monopolistic practices; enacted in 1890. 
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more competing corporations (subject to certain materiality thresholds)
4
, the Canadian 
Competition Act does not contain any articles that specifically address the subject of 
interlocking directorships, but rather this topic is addressed in policy statements 
published by the Canadian Bureau of Competition’s Merger Enforcement Guidelines 
(MEGs).  However, the Canadian Competition Act does not ignore the subject of 
interlocking relationships or its implications.  Instead, it recognizes the intricacies of 
these corporate relationships and makes specific provisions as to when and how these 
relations should be investigated in order to maintain the competitive integrity of the 
Canadian capital markets.  According to Canadian law, for interlocking directorships to 
come under review  
...it must qualify as a “merger5” as defined in the Competition Act, i.e., it must 
be found to result in the “acquisition or establishment, direct or indirect, by 
one or more persons... of control over or significant interest in the whole or 
part of a business of a competitor, supplier, director, buyer, or other person. 
[Furthermore] for these purposes, a “significant interest” is defined by the 
Bureau as “the ability to materially influence the economic behaviour of the 
business”. Interlocking directorships may also be reviewed if they are a 
feature of a larger transaction that otherwise qualifies as a “merger.”(Katz 14) 
As such, interlocking directorships are not as closely monitored in Canada as they are 
in the United States.  Of concern to the Canadian Competition Bureau (the Bureau), is 
                                                          
4
 Katz, M, “Canadian Merger Law and Interlocking Directorships/ Minority Shareholdings,”, Davies Ward 
Phillips & Vineberg LLP, North American Free Trade & Investment Report 
5
 As opposed to a formal merger proposal 
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1. The Bureau will consider three main points when examining the competitive 
implications of an interlocking relationship’s ability to, 
a. materially influence the economic behavior of the business 
b. obtain confidential information 
c. make changes to incentives 
2. When making its assessment, the Bureau will explore the following factors 
a. Any attached rights to minority interest shareholdings 
b. The nature of competition in the relevant market 
c. Dividend share of the minority interest in comparison to the equity 
ownership share 
d. Any special powers, including voting or veto rights 
e. Any special agreements or arrangements that could constitute a 
"material influence" 
f. The composition of the board of directors 
g. Board meeting attendance and voting patterns 
h. The role and duty of the "interlocked" director, including the type of 
information to which the director has access 
i. The practical extent to which the minority shareholder can exert 
pressure on the company's decision-making process (e.g., if it is the 
largest shareholder). 
                                                          
6
 Katz, M, “Canadian Merger Law and Interlocking Directorships/ Minority Shareholdings,”, Davies Ward 
Phillips & Vineberg LLP 
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3. Passive minority shareholding can still come under review if it is found that it 
has had a material influence on economic behavior of the business 
4. The Bureau considers structural remedies (as opposed to behavioral remedies) 
to be the most effective remedy, when dealing with concerns over interlocking 
relationships. Examples of structural remedies include 
a. Resignation of the interlocking director7 
b. Appointment of an independent director as a replacement7 




d. Divestiture of all of the acquiring firms’ interests in the target8 
e. Termination of all ancillary agreements8 
In conclusion, although Canadian corporate law is not as decisive as American 
law on the matter of interlocking directorates, the issue is addressed and investigated 
when a need arises.  This need arises when evidence is presented that the interlocking 
relationship is effectively a “merger.”  This is defined by whether the interlocking 
relationship allows for the “control over or significant interest” by one party over the 
other.  Although the phrase “significant interest” is open to interpretation, the benefit 
of having such a statement allows firms operating in Canada the freedom to seek out 
inter-organizational relationships in order to gain knowledge without being 
legislatively restricted.  This is of significance because there are several reasons why 
interlocks should (and should not) exist. 
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 As in the case of the acquisition of Sogides Ltée by Quebecor Media Inc. 
8
 As in the case of the restructuring of Loews Cineplex 
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ii. Why Interlocks Exist 
Although the subject of interlocking directorates has been discussed by many authors 
over the years, the specific joint topic of interlocking boards and merger activity has not 
been as extensively covered.  This section of the paper will present a summary of the 
literature concerning interlocks and discuss how some of theories can be applicable to 
this paper’s thesis.  
The question that inevitably arises when the topic of interlocking directorates is 
proposed is; why do they exist?  Although the “inter-organizational” and the "intra-class" 
theories provide two general motivating notions, shareholder wealth maximization and 
agency, behind the existence of interlocks, there exists within each of these theories three 
main drivers that attempt to explain why interlocks exist. 
 Agency Theory (Intra-Class) 
o Firm Size 
o Management Control 
o Class Hegemony 
 Shareholder Wealth Maximization Theory (Inter-Organizational) 
o Firm Size 
o Financial Health / Resource Dependency 
o Knowledge Transfer 
As detailed in the lists above, firm size is a driver of board interlocks in both 
agency as well as wealth maximization scenarios.  Peter Dooly’s seminal paper (1973) 
argues that the size of the organizations plays a crucial role in the development and 
maintenance of interlocks, stating that 
The largest corporations tend to have the most interlocks.  This may occur 
because the directors of the largest corporations are the most knowledgeable, 
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the most capable, and the most accomplished men available. Other 
corporations would naturally seek their advice and would rather have them on 
their board than men of less ability. This may also occur, however, because of 
factors unrelated to managerial ability. The director of a giant corporation 
undoubtedly has more personal influence with other companies, with potential 
investors, and with the government than the common man. Having the 
director from a large corporation on your board may also lead to profitable 
business with that corporation. (316) 
Dooly’s argument of firm size as a driver for interlocks advocates the positive, wealth 
maximization, motivation for the relationship.  Conversely, firm size can equally be a 
supporting attribute for the agency aspects of interlocks if the interlocking relationship is 
created solely for the purpose of expanding individual directors’ power / influence or 
created as a result of managerial empire building.  Patrick Gaughan’s 2004 paper entitled 
M&A Lesson: Beware of Empire Builders presents evidence indicating that many of the 
largest M&A deals turned out to be huge failures because of managerial empire-building 
by CEOs
9
 that were uncontrolled by ineffectual boards.  Interlocks can perpetuate the 
lazy board phenomenon if the interlocking director is merely acting as a managerial pawn 
sent out by management in order to try to gain as much information
10
 on potential 
acquisition target(s) in order to askew the problems associated with managerial hubris in 
corporate takeovers (such as overpayment) described by Roll (1986).  With better market 
information, collected by the interlocking director(s), management can thus perpetuate its 
empire building objects. 
                                                          
9
 Firm CEOs’ decisions can be views as proxies of decisions made by the entire management team. 
10
 In essence, interlocked directors will act as scouts, collecting valuable market information. 
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A closely related, agency driven hypothesis for interlocks is the management control 
theory (Mace 1971 and Dooley 1973).  This theory suggests that members of the board of 
directors are specifically chosen and hired by management in order to passively agree to 
management decisions.  This view sees “management as isolated and independent from 
external pressures. Interlocks are considered accidental and serve little importance,” 
(O’Hagan, Green 2004).  Bebchuck, Fried, and Walker (2002) suggest that managerial 
control can also lead to managerial rent extraction, rubber-stamped by directors of their 
own choosing, as well as the tunneling of resources. However, evidence by Mintz and 
Schwartz (1985) details how interlocks between banks and other non-financial corporate 
form the basis of banks’ control of capital flows and implies that interlocks are often not 
accidental and serve a specific and important purpose. 
Last, the class hegemony theory (Koenig, Gogel 1975) places the onus of 
interlocking directorate on already existing social, familial, or other connections between 
upper / elite class individuals.  As such interlocks exist to reaffirm these relationships / 
connections as well as to (ultimately) perpetuate them.  In contrast to this idea 
Haunschild and Beckman (1998) argue that although interlocks do matter and that their 
effects are material, their effectiveness or influence is either increased or decreased with 
respect to certain conditions within the context of their existence.  They suggest that since 
interlocking directorates provide information to the participating firms, then the 
interlock’s effectiveness (and impact) should decrease or increase based on whether there 
are alternative sources (or lack thereof) for the same information.  Overall, 
...results provide evidence that alternate sources of information affect the 
influence of interlock partners on acquisition decisions[…]when interlocks matter, 
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they appear to matter less for large firms, for central firms, and for firms whose 
CEO belongs to the Business Roundtable or Business Council. Interlocks matter 
more for activities that get large amounts of business press coverage, and 
interlocks with similar firms matter more than interlocks with dissimilar 
firms.(839) 
With respect to the shareholder wealth maximization motivators of interlocks, the 
financial health / resource dependency theories provide alternative drivers for the 
existence of interlocking directorates.  These hypotheses suggest that, financially troubled 
firms and firms needing to secure access to certain resources, will tend to have closer 
relationships (hence interlocks in many cases) with the financial institutions and / or 
firms that can provide these needed resources.  In the case of a financially troubled firm, 
for example, having an interlocking relationship with a financial institution will not only 
allow it to better navigate the intricacies of securing needed access to financial resources, 
but will reciprocally allow the interlocked financial firm the opportunity to place a 
representative on the borrowing firm’s board and thereby gain improved access to the 
firm’s inner workings and thus exercise more control of how financial resources are used.  
Ultimately, this will dictate how soon and how completely the financial firm is repaid.  In 
summary, the financial health / resource dependency theories suggest that interlocks are 
value maximizing because they are created between firms in order to secure access to 
financial and / or material resources thereby reducing the uncertainly created by actively 
searching for them on the open market. 
Finally, knowledge transfer theory argues that interlocks are a value maximizing 
corporate strategy because they are simply a mechanism through which knowledge and / 
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or information is transferred between organizations, individuals, or both.  In essence, the 
existence of interlocks serves no other purpose than to provide a conduit through which 
information travels; in the case that an alternative, and more efficient, medium exists that 
delivers higher quantity and quality information, then interlocks will become 
inconsequential.  As such, Haunschild and Beckman’s argument that the effectiveness of 
interlocks will diminish in the presence of alternative (and perhaps more efficient and / or 
reliable) sources of information, supports the knowledge transfer theory and run counter 
to the class hegemony idea because the existence of class connections should not have 
any effect on firm performance if there exist alternative mediums through which board 
directors can obtain information pertaining to market competitors and / or allies.  
According to Carpenter and Westphal  
The direct communication between managers reduces ambiguity of knowledge 
transferred. . . learning is particularly vivid because directors observe the 
decision-making process firsthand in their monitoring role, participate actively by 
giving advice to management, and then witness the consequences of those 
decisions. This information is typically more timely and up-to-date than that 
derived from secondary sources, and it may also be more salient because of its 
recency. (2001) 
In summary, the literature presented here divides the motivation for interlocking 
boards between the shareholder wealth maximization (inter-organizational) theory and 
the agency driven (intra-class) theory.  Furthermore, within each of these hypothesis 
therein lays three specific drivers of interlocks.  Within the agency theory, firm size, 
management control, and class hegemony are suggested as the agency drivers of 
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interlocks, whereas within the shareholder wealth maximization theory, firm size, 
financial health / resource dependency, and knowledge transfer are the shareholder wealth 
maximization arguments in favour of interlocks. 
IV. Hypotheses and Methodology 
As previously introduced, the main objective of this paper is to ascertain the effects 
interlocks have on the participants during a merger and / or acquisition.  From the 
literature cited above, the purpose of the interlocking relationship can be to either support 
the personal goals of managers and directors (agency) or to transfer knowledge and give 
access to financial and other resources, all of which are needed to ensure the successful 
and profitable continuation the firms (shareholder wealth maximization).  We expect that 
if the agency theory is the primary driver for the creating of interlocks, then mergers 
between interlocking firms should result in value destruction for shareholders of both 
firms, whereas if the shareholder maximization theory is instead the driving force, then 
transactions between interlocked firms should exhibit value creating for all shareholders. 
To test for which of these hypotheses plays the most prominent role in motivating 
interlocks between firms, the first step will be to create portfolios of each merger pair 
(target and acquirer) where each firm’s weight in the portfolio is equal to its size11 
relative to the total size of both firms in the deal.  This is done in order to capture the joint 
effect (covariance between the two merging firms) of the interlock on the merger pair 
rather than just each individual firm.  Next, the firm and board-specific characteristics of 
each entity within a merger pair will be used to predict the likelihood of an interlock 
existing between them.  This step is taken in order to learn more about the elements that 
facilitate or hinder the creation of interlocks between any two firms.  The firm-specific 
                                                          
11
 Proxied as the log of a firm’s market capitalization 
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characteristic that will be tested will be firm size, and the board-specific characteristics 
will be director share ownership, stock compensation, tenure, and the Fraction of outside, 
inside, grey, and women directors. 
Third, the resulting likelihood of interlock value among each pair of interlocking 
firms will be used as the explanatory variable to explain the manifestation of several 
deal-specific characteristics such as deal completion, method of payment, toeholds etc
12
.  
Lastly, the calculated likelihood of an interlock within each merger pair will be used to 
explain that pairs’ cumulative abnormal returns from 30 days before the announcement of 
the merger to 60 days after the announcement
12
. 
Starting first with how the interlocking relationship relates to the firm specific 
characteristic firm size, both the agency and shareholder wealth maximization drivers for 
interlocks will be evaluated using Logit regression to predict the propensity of interlocks 
given firm size. Under the shareholder wealth maximization perspective – we expect 
small firms to seek “experienced” and connected directors in order to gain the benefits of 
their experience. As such, we expect a higher number and / or percentage of small firm 
boards to be made up of interlocking directors than at larger firms. Conversely, under the 
agency theory we expect larger firms to contain more interlocks than smaller firms, as 
their more numerous directors are encouraged to sit on other firms’ boards in order to 
obtain knowledge on possible future acquisition targets.  Thus to test for these 
conjectures, the Logit regression that will be used will take on the following 
form,                                     , where P(Interlock) is the 
propensity to interlock, and Size is the natural logarithm of each firm’s market 
capitalization, and Control are the independent control variables NatRes which takes on a 
                                                          
12
 For robustness purposes, the effects of observed (rather than predicted) interlock will also be tested 
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 which represents the relative size of each firm to its merger partner.  In 
summary 
 H1: Propensity to Interlock given firm size 
                                      
o SWM15: Expect sign of β1 to be negative 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
 Turning to bidder and target firms’ individual board characteristics, their 
interactions with, and relationship to interlocks must be examined carefully due to the 
inevitable, and unavoidable, endogeneity issues that arise in determining which variables 
effect which.  For example, are boards more likely to have outside directors because they 
have an interlocking relationship, or alternatively are interlocking relationships to be 
expected because a board has outside directors?  A mitigating assumption at this point, is 
to assume that in most cases, decisions pertaining to board characteristics were made 
prior to the existence of the interlocking relationship, or the board itself for that matter.  
Thus, the hypotheses made here with respect to the interaction between board 
characteristics and the interlocking relationships will be made on the basis of this 
premise.  As such, expect board characteristics such as director share ownership, fraction 
of insiders, outsiders and grey directors on each board, director option compensation, and 
board tenure
16
 to effect the existence (propensity of) an interlocking relationship within 
the contents of the shareholder wealth maximization and Agency drivers of interlocks.  
                                                          
13
 Controlling for firm industry is necessary since the majority of the sample firms used (≈ 67%, see table 
11) belong to the natural resource industry. 
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15
 Shareholder Wealth Maximization 
16
 Proxied as the time each director has spent serving on the board of directors of each firm 
22 
Under shareholder wealth maximization we expect the propensity of interlocks to 
increase with director ownership, director stock compensation, and tenure thus sginalling 
director entrenchment into the firms they expect to serve for a significant portion of time. 
Under the alternate agency, theory, low director ownership, a low proportion of the board 
compensated with options, and low tenure would indicate that those serving on the board 
are not as invested in the long term future of the firm.  In turn, this could imply that any 
interlocking directors from such boards are there in order to fulfill the very specific 
requirements of an agency driven management, where they are serving as interlocking 
directors simply to cull information pertaining to a potential target by sitting on its board. 
Once that task is done and the smaller firm is either accepted for purchase or discarded, 
the interlocking directors, who have no significant ties to the purchased entity, are free to 
move to other endeavours.  In addition, we expect an increase in the propensity of 
interlocks the greater the fraction of outsiders serving on each board (indicating 
independent boards), as well as a greater fraction of grey directors indicating that 
directors serving on interlocking boards have other professional expertise which they 
bring to the management of the firms they serve – further evidence of the knowledge 
transfer hypothesis for interlocks.  Alternatively, under agency, we expect the fraction of 
insider directors to positively affect the propensity of interlocks.  In summary; 
 H2: Propensity to Interlock given director share ownership 
                                                
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
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 H3: Propensity to Interlock given stock compensation 
                                            
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
 H4: Propensity to Interlock given the directors’ average tenure 
                                             
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
 H5: Propensity of Interlocks given fraction of outside directors 
                                              
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
 H6: Propensity to Interlock given fraction of inside directors 
                                              
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be negative 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive or 0 
 H7: Propensity to Interlock given fraction of grey directors 
                                         
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
 In his 2010 paper “Breaking the Boardroom Gender Barrier: the Human Capital 
of Female Corporate Directors”, which also centers’ on the topic of the resource 
dependency theory, Paul Dunn reiterates the arguments made in this paper that linkages 
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to other corporations and individuals, and thus access to critical resources and 
information, is one of the most important tasks (along with giving legitimacy to a firm 
and providing advice and counsel) attributed directors.  In as such, he tests for five 
“human capital characteristics”, insider, specialist, business manager, generalist, and 
influential
17
, found in women newly appointed to board of directors.  In his sample of 
17,169 senior officers of major organizations (14,863 men and 2,306 women) drawn from 
the Canada Financial Post Directory of Directors for 2004, finds that women who are 
business managers are “are the most favoured group (32.6%) and insiders the least 
favoured (8.3% of the sample) of newly included directors. According to Dunn, business 
managers are; 
...individuals who are CEOs or senior executives at either public or private for-profit 
firms...[who] provide expertise on competition, decision making and problem solving 
within the business milieu...[and] through their links with other firms, these directors 
also become important external communication channels (5) 
Hillman et al. (2007) also argue that female directors have the potential to link their 
firms, to different constituencies than their male counter parts, and as such we expect the 
average number of women to be positive under SWM and zero or negative under Agency. 
 H8: Propensity to Interlock given fraction of women directors 
                                           
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
                                                          
17
 Insider is a director who is the founder, related to the founder, or is an executive of the firm. Specialist is 
a director who is a professional banker, lawyer, government bureaucrat or public relations specialist. 
Business manager is a director who is a CEO or a manager at either a public or a private for-profit firm. 
Generalist is a management consultant or a corporate director. Influential is a woman who works for a 
university, non-profit organization, hospital or medical facility, philanthropic organization, cultural 
organization or is a recognized community leader 
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To summarize hypotheses 1-8 above, their conjectures are presented below in tabular 
form. Each variable discussed in these hypotheses will be listed, followed by its predicted 
sign under both the agency and shareholder wealth maximization drivers of interlocks. 
  Predicted Sign Under 
Variable  SWM  Agency 
 
Firm-Specific Characteristics 
 Firm Size  -  + 
Board-Specific Characteristics 
 Director Share Ownership  +  - / 0 
 Stock Compensation  +  - / 0 
 Average Tenure  +  - / 0 
 Fraction of Outside Directors  +  - / 0 
 Fraction of Inside Directors  -  + / 0 
 Fraction of Grey Directors  +  - / 0 
 Fraction of Women Directors  +  - / 0 
 
At this point, the firm and / or board-specific characteristics from the above table 
that are found to most significantly predict the likelihood of observing an interlock will 





, in order to model the overall likelihood of an interlocking 
relationship.  This equation will take the following form, for Xn number of significant 
variables used to predict the likelihood of an interlock; 
                                
Next, we will apply the model above to each firm’s data in order to calculate the 
likelihood
20
 of observing an interlock on the board of each firm. This result will then be 
                                                          
18
 The variable ln_mrktcap, which is equal to the natural logarithm of each firm’s market capitalization 
19
 The dummy variable NatRes, which takes on a value of 1 when a firm operates within the natural 
resources industry and 0 otherwise 
20
 This likelihood ratio should be unique to each firm, since each firm has a unique combination of firm and 
board-specific characteristics  
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used in determining whether the likelihood of an interlock has an affect on any of the 
following deal-specific characteristics; Deal Status, Deal Escalation, Contestation, 
Hostility, Toehold, Percentage Toehold, Premium, and Method of Payment (Cash, Stock 
or Mix)
21
.  We expect this aggregate interlocking relationship to be a significant 
determinant of these deal-specific characteristics, because it will incorporate many of the 
key elements that are associated with / motivate the existence of interlocks. 
For example, when analysing the likelihood of observing a successful deal, the model 
                                will be used, and the significance of the 
P(Interlock) variable will be noted.  This process will then be repeated for each of the 
aforementioned deal characteristics.  It is important to note that because control variables 
for firms size, and industry have already been incorporated into the model that yielded 
the P(interlock) value, no further control variables will be used when analysing the 
likelihood of each deal characteristic.  For robustness purposes, this process will be 
repeated using the observed interlock
22
, as the independent variable rather than the 
likelihood value calculated earlier.  As such, when modeling likelihood of any of the deal 
characteristics mentioned, the control variables for firm size and industry will be 
incorporated into the model along with the observed interlock variable.  Therefore, using 
deal status as an example once more, the model will now take on the form 
                                                            . 
We expect that deals among interlocking firms whose relationship is known (or 
rumoured) to be motivated by wealth maximization incentives, will not exhibit higher 
rates of success than deals without an interlocking relationship.  The reason for this logic 
                                                          
21
 See Table 4 for a definition of all variables used 
22
 Observed Interlock is a dummy variable that takes on the value of 1 when an interlock is observed 
between merging firms and 0 otherwise 
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is, stems for the notion that if the interlocking relationship is driven by mutual gains on 
both sides, there is no reason to expect the target firm to simply “roll-over” and accept a 
bid from its interlock partner.  In fact, we feel that if the offer is not suitable, that target 
firm’s management can and should, in the best interest of the firm’s shareholders, reject 
the offer.  On the other hand, the market will fully expect the successful completion of 
deals between firms whose relationship was known (or rumoured) to be driven by agency 
incentive, because in essence the successful completion of a merger between the two 
firms is precisely the objected of the interlock (i.e. this has been the point of the interlock 
all along).  In the same breath, instances of negotiation escalation, deal contestation, and 
hostility for deals with agency driven interlocks should be significantly lower than other 
deals, because we expect that bidder and target management to have communicated their 
intentions to merge to each other before a formal bid announcement is made. Escalation 
is defined in this paper as the situation when the initial bidder deal is rejected (for any 
reason), and negotiation between bidder and target commence.  Escalation is proxied by 
any announcement that a target firm’s management has rejected an initial offer proposed 
for their firm. Escalation does not pre-empt hostility; escalation can simply be a call to 
renegotiate the deal terms, whereas deal contestation is defined as the participation of a 
rival bidding firm (as a white knight or otherwise as a rival bidder), and lastly, hostility 
represents the situation when the initial bidder deal is rejected (for any reason), and target 
management makes an announcement that the bidder’s offer is not welcome and take any 
action available to it, such as proxy-fights, reverse purchases etc. in order to defend itself 
against this unwanted bid.  Hostility is also delineated by acrimonious exchange of 
communication between target and acquiring firms within the press. 
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Conversely, deals with wealth maximization driven interlocks should not exhibit 
significantly more (or less) instances of escalation, deal contestation, and / or hostility 
than another other deals. It is important to note at this point that, when analysing the 
various deal-characteristics, those that take on 1 / 0 values (such deal status, hostility etc.) 
will be regressed using Logit regression, whereas those that are continuous variables 
(such as the premium paid, and the percentage toehold) will be regressed using the OLS 
model.  
Given the models and arguments presented above, hypothesis 9-16 below present 
our expectations for the likelihood of each deal characteristic given the likelihood of 
observing an interlocking relationship within any firm in our sample; 
H9: Propensity of successful deal completion given the likelihood of an interlock 
                               
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be 0 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
 H10: Propensity of escalation in negotiations given the likelihood of an interlock 
                               
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be 0 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative 
 H11: Propensity of the deal being contested given the likelihood of an interlock 
                                 
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be 0 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative 
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 H12: Propensity of hostility given the likelihood of an interlock 
                              
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be 0 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative 
It is important to note that hypotheses 10-12 involved mechanisms which the 
management of target firms can employ in an attempt to gain as much value for their firm 
as possible during a takeover / merger, or to fend off un-welcomed proposals to merge.  
We do not expect the management of target firms to use these mechanisms when they are 
subject of takeover attempts by firms with which they are interlocked under agency 
driven incentives. 
With respect to pre-deal ownership of target firms, deals among all interlocking 
firms should exhibit significantly higher frequency of toeholds
23
 among the participants, 
as well as higher fraction of toehold ownership, i.e. the bidding firm should own more of 
the target than it would otherwise own if the interlocking relationship did not exists.  The 
reason for this is twofold; assuming that the interlocking relationship is motivated by 
wealth maximization drivers, larger firms, who thanks to the interlocked director now 
know more about their smaller (target) counterparts, are likely invest in the smaller firms 
and thus assure themselves the prolongation of the relationship and its benefits, as well as 
to keep away potential rivals looking to purchase the smaller firm.  Alternatively, if 
agency drivers are what motivated the interlock, larger toeholds are expected in 
compliance with the management empire-building desires, as discussed earlier.  As such, 
this is why instances of toeholds and higher fractions of toeholds are hypothesised to be 
                                                          
23
 Toehold is defined here as one firm owning any value > 0% of the other. 
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greater among interlocking firms, regardless of what motivated the firms to interlock.  
Formally; 
 H13: Propensity of the existence toehold given the likelihood of an interlock  
                            
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
 H14: The average observed fraction of toehold given the likelihood of an 
interlock 
                          
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
With respect to bid premium, it is expected that deals between interlocking firms 
whose relationship is based on wealth maximization drivers will not exhibit significantly 
different premiums than non-interlocking deals, whereas deals between interlocking firms 
whose relationship is known (or rumoured) to be based on agency driven incentives 
should exhibit premiums that are larger than non-interlocking deals.  Due to the fact that 
the interlock relationship affords each firm the opportunity to know more about the other 
than otherwise would have been possible, the target firms (in all cases) should have little 
or no opportunity to mask their true value in hopes of negotiating a higher purchase 
premium.  Effectively, the target firms’ bargaining power is greatly diminished by virtue 
of the interlock.  This however, does not necessarily mean that the bidding firms will pay 
a bid premium that is less than those paid in non-interlocking deals.  Bidding firms who 
underpay will risk a variety of consequences that may include, but not limited to, the 
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target firm rejecting the offer (and the relationship) and choosing to remain independent, 
the target firm seeking out a white knight, and / or the appearance of a rival bidder, and 
even the threat of legal action by target shareholders.  Failure of the bidding firm to 
obtain the target will, in essence, mean that the target firm (or a successful rival) will 
obtain any and all benefits, i.e. any knowledge and / or support the target firm garnered 
from its interlocking relationship, transferred from the bidding firm to the target firm 
during the course of their interlocking relationship.  Since bidding firms will not want 
this to occur, they will probably pay a premium to the target that is commensurate with 
those paid by other non-interlocked bidding firms.  As such, we expect the bid premiums 
in deals with wealth maximization-based interlocks to be no different than those without 
a similar relationship. 
The premium argument, however, should be different for agency-based interlocks. 
Given that the interlocking  relationship between the two firms was created to in order to 
achieve one firm’s management’s personal agenda – the only possible way to convince 
the other firm’s management and shareholders to agree to the plan is to sweeten the deal 
at the time of purchase.  This however does not mean that the interlocking bidding firm 
will pay as high a premium as a non-interlocking bidder; the interlocking relationship 
will prevent that from occurring.   In fact, given agency drivers for the interlock, we 
expect to observe the premiums paid by interlocking bidders to be significantly higher 
than interlocking bidders whose interlock with the target were based on wealth 
maximization drivers, and less than those paid by bidders who do not have an interlock. 
Thus, the agency driven interlock benefits both participating by allowing the target firm 
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to earn some premium, but saves the bidding firm some of the premium it would have 
otherwise paid out had it not developed that relationship with the target.  
Once again, using an OLS regression; 
 H15: The average observed premium given the likelihood of an interlock 
                         
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be 0 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
Lastly, with regards to the method of payment chosen between the two parties, an 
earlier paper on this subject by Betton, Nawfal, and Paeglis (2007) suggested the 
following four theories to explain the implied message sent to the market via the choice 
of payment method in an M&A deal with respect to the topic of interlocking directorates: 
• Scenario I: No interlock, bidder offers stock. In this situation the asymmetric 
information arises on both the bidder and the target sides of the transaction. The bidder 
offers stock, the value of which the target does not know; and in return, the bidder 
receives a target which cannot be valued exactly. This scenario is referred to as the base 
case. 
• Scenario II: No interlock, the bidder offers cash. Here, the overall asymmetry of 
information between the two firms is reduced due to the revelation of the true value of the 
bidder’s offer to the target. While there is no doubt about the value of the consideration 
target will receive, the “true” value of the target remains uncertain, due to the asymmetric 
information about the value of the target’s assets in their current use as well as the 
uncertainty about the synergies generated by the merger. 
• Scenario III: Interlock exists, bidder offers stock. Markets should perceive this 
transaction as the riskiest type since the bidder offers stock despite having an interlocking 
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board with the target and thereby more information about the true stand-alone value of 
the target. By still choosing to offer stock the bidder signals its wish to share the potential 
downside risk with target’s shareholders suggesting that there remains a great deal of 
uncertainty about the value of the potential synergy gains.  
• Scenario IV: Interlock exists, bidder offers cash. The asymmetry of information 
between the bidder and target is reduced and the bidder is confident of the true value of 
the target’s assets in their current use. There remains only the uncertainty about the value 
of the synergies to be generated by the merger. The choice of cash as the medium of 
exchange sends the strongest signal about the confidence of bidder’s management in their 
estimate of the synergy 
As such, it is hypothesised that because the acquirer shareholders know (or are 
relatively assured) the true value of the target firm, and that, reciprocally, the target 
shareholders know (or are relatively assured) the true value of the bidding firm’s offer, 
then there should be significantly more instances of cash being used among interlocking 
deals then otherwise would have been observed.  Formally; 
 H16: Propensity of payment in cash, given the likelihood of an interlock 
                         
o SWM: Expect sign of β1 to be positive 
o Agency: Expect sign of β1 to be negative or 0 
In addition, and by extension of hypothesis 16, the propensity using either stock or mixed 
payment methods, given the likelihood of an interlock, are expected to be negative or 0 
for deals involving interlocks motivated by shareholder wealth maximization incentives 
and positive for instances where the interlocking relationship is motivated by agency. 
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To summarize hypotheses 9-16 above, their conjectures are presented below in tabular 
form. Each variable discussed in these hypotheses will be listed, followed by the 
predicted sign of the likelihood of an interlock as their explanatory variable for said under 
both the agency and shareholder wealth maximization drivers of interlocks. 
  Predicted Sign of P(Interlock) under 
Variable  SWM  Agency 
 
Deal-Specific Characteristics 
 Deal Status  0  + 
 Deal Escalation  0  - 
 Contestation  0  - 
 Hostility  0  - 
 Toehold  +  + 
 %Toehold  +  + 
 Premium  0  + 
 Cash  +  - / 0 
 Stock or Mix  -  + / 0 
 
 Turning to the main topic of deal returns; interlocking directorates can have a 
positive, negative, or no effect on shareholder (target and bidder) wealth.  Since, as 
argued previously, interlocks can be formed when smaller firms seek out directors of 
larger firms to sit on their board in order to benefit from the knowledge, experience and 
connections said individuals hold, interlocks can have a positive effect on both (future) 
target and acquirer firms. Due to the existence of this joint relationship, the interlocked 
firms will become more knowledgeable of each other than otherwise would have been 
possible, and as such the smaller firms will gain access to more professional and 
knowledgeable directors and acquiring firms will gain access to a potential future 
acquisition targets.  Target firms’ shareholders will accept this relationship if they believe 
(or it is their intent) that the firm will be sold in the future. Thus, in order to better assure 
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the success of their firms until such time, the target shareholders will accept the interlock 
with a larger firm, giving them access to knowledge and expertise which should help 
them better compete in the market place.  The market, realizing this, will reward target 
shareholders for their strategic thinking in the form of higher returns relative their non-
interlocking counterparts, at the announcement of the interlock
24
.  The market should also 
reward the larger firms’ shareholders for their strategic thinking of linking up with future 
potential targets; however, given the hypothesised difference in size between interlocking 
pairs, this effect may not be significantly measurable. 
 Alternatively, the interlocking relationship could have no effect on the value of 
either target or bidder firms.  Market participants may, for example, deem that due to its 
size, the large firm will extract cooperation from the smaller firm due to the latter’s need 
for the former’s director(s).  Seeing no value creation in the possible coercion practiced 
by the larger firms, markets will not reward these entities with higher valuations.  Taking 
the perspective of the smaller firms, although market participants may accept that larger 
firms will try and force cooperation of their smaller interlocks because of their size, they 
may likewise conclude that that smaller firms can take advantage of the relationship and 
still retain some of their independence.  This is because in the small firms’ favour is the 
salient risk that their larger interlock partner cannot force complete cooperation for fear 
that a rival large firm will make a more generous bid for their small interlocks and thus 
put any and all investments (including knowledge) the large interlock partner made in the 
smaller firms at risk. Thus, the with the benefits to each firm cancelling out the other, 
firm value for both firms in an interlocking relationship can remain unchanged. 
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 Given the knowledge transfer theory, interlocking target firms, hypothesised to be smaller, will have 
access to knowledge and resources of a much larger firm, as this access to a valuable resource (information) 
should lead to higher valuations for interlocked target firm versus comparable firm without such access. 
36 
 Lastly, interlocks can have an entirely negative effect on both firms’ value.  
Market participants may deem that although the interlock between larger firms and 
smaller ones will indeed result in a transfer of knowledge between the two, it is the 
smaller firms that will benefit most from this relationship because they will essentially 
leech onto the larger firms, and by virtue of having access to the larger firms’ board 
members and making demands on their time and efforts, the smaller firms will 
simultaneously deprive the larger firms from enjoying the full benefits that these 
individuals provide to their management.  In addition, the market may fear that, in their 
pursuit of a potential future target – perhaps motivated by management agency drivers 
such as empire building – larger firms will give their smaller interlocks access to market 
experience, proprietary knowledge, as well as financial and / or material resources 
without accepting equitable compensation due to the smaller firms’ lack of wealth at the 
start of the relationship.  Alternatively, interlocks may be deemed detrimental for smaller 
(future target) firms by the market if the benefits of the interlock look to be sequestered 
mainly by the larger firm.  Larger firms, may use their size to appropriate unique 
expertise / knowledge gained by smaller (perhaps more nimble and innovative) firm, and 
thus the interlocking relationship becomes simply a mechanism with which larger firms 
can achieve access to firms with proven innovative techniques / knowledge, and thereby 
reduce the amount of risk they are exposed to when conducting M&A transactions with 
firm with whom they had a very limited (or no) relationship prior to the bid.  As quoted 
earlier by Penning (1983), interlocks are a less radical solution to knowledge acquisition 
than a merger and / or acquisition, and thus larger firms should tend to use this 
mechanism more often, since it is a lot cheaper and easier to implement than purchasing 
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another firm outright,  in order to remain innovative and fresh.  Another possibility, is that 
the market may punish both firms simultaneously, if it is deemed that the interlock is 
nothing but a manifestation of the class hegemony theory, whereby the interlock only 
exists to serve the need of a particular directors (or directors), and is driven by personal 
pursuits of power or social status rather that based on solid business fundamentals.  
Finally, the threat of legal repercussions brought up against the interlocked firms is 
always a possibility, if it is determined that the interlocking relationship is effectively a 
merger
25
.  These legal consequences would, of course, lead to lower valuation for both 
firms, to adjust for value lost during litigation as well as any penalties that must be paid, 
and / or restructuring required to be made in order to comply with the law. 
However, based on the literature cited previously, and with respect to this paper, the 
benefits of the interlocks should outweigh their drawbacks.  Thus we expect that the 
interlocking relationship will yield positive value for both the target and acquirer firm.  
We believe that the benefits of an interlocks should also not be exclusively enjoyed by 
one party alone; otherwise the interlocking relationship will not exist in the first place if 
either of the parties feels that they will be at a disadvantage with the interlock in place.  
After all, the creation of an interlock is a mutually consensual choice between two 
entities, and thus must be equitable to both or it would not exist.  Smaller firms cannot 
force larger firms to allow their directors the option of working on other boards, and 
likewise larger firms cannot force smaller firms to accept individuals onto their board 
whom they do not wish to include.  Both firms will know that it is inevitable that 
information will travel between them via the interlocking director, and thus both will 
agree to the relationship only if there is something to be gained for each of them. 
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In addition to expecting positive returns to both participants in a merger between 
interlocks, we also expect this value creation to take on a unique profile in contrast to the 
one often observed the literature.  Whereas it is common to observe the target’s price rise 
to reflect the bid and premium on announcement day, and the acquire price to fall slightly 
or remain unchanged, we expect that an interlocking target will see its stock price, and by 
extension its cumulative abnormal returns, to rise in the period before the announcement 
of a bid i.e. during the life of the interlock.  Whether the interlock is motivated by agency 
or value creation, we expect the target price to rise because in the case of agency, target 
shareholders can expect a bid premium on announcement of the merger and to a lesser 
extent some support / expertise from the larger firm during the life of the interlock.  In the 
case of value creation, target shareholders will see their holdings appreciate as their firm 
works with the larger firm and secures access to knowledge and needed resources.  Thus 
with the acceptance of the interlock, the small firms’ management is exchanging any 
future bargaining power, for some immediate increase in their valuation as well as the 
opportunity to learn from and work with a bigger more established firm.  
 Inversely, for the bidding firms, we expect the benefits of the interlocking 
relationship to manifest themselves after any bid announcement.  This is because due to 
the already existing relationship between the two, as argued earlier, the likelihood that the 
bidding firm did not over pay will be higher, as will the likelihood of synergies between 
the two merging firms.  No significant gains should be made by either firm on the 
announcement day of the bid, since the interlocking relationship should be well known to 
market participants, who in turn would find no surprise in a merger announcement 
between the two firms.  In essence, the interlocking relationship will yield a different 
39 
return structure than that normally observed during standard M&A activity where the 
bidder is observed to make negative abnormal returns on the day of and following the 
merger announcement, and the target firm show significantly positive gains on the day of 
and following the merger announcement.  These gains (positive and negative) are driven 
by the surprise element of one firm making a bid (hostile or otherwise) to purchase 
another , whereas the gains made by firms within an interlocking relationship should not 
be driven by surprise, but rather from value creating cooperation between two entities 
who chose to work together consensually.  The figure below illustrates the hypothesised 
effects on the firms’ returns during in the 30 26days before the announcement of the 
merger deal between the interlocking firms (day 0), the 3 days surrounding the deal 




For each of the time periods specified in the diagram above, the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns (CARs) of Acquirers, Targets, and Portfolios for each of the thee 
windows discussed, (-30, -1,), (-1, 1), (0, 60), will be obtained using the standard event-
study methodology a la Brown and Warner (1985).  The estimation window will take on 
duration of 250 days, and the number of observations within that time span will be no 
less than 100 in order to ensure that any thinly trade stocks are eliminated from the 
calculation procedure. 
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 Although the effects of the interlock on the abnormal returns of both the future target and bidder firms 
should be most significant on and around the announcement of the interlocks, our hypothesise studies the 
effects of the interlock 30 days before the announcement of the bid in order to capture the relationship 
between the interlock and deal anticipation. 
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for either partner of 
the interlock 
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Next, the cumulative abnormal returns will be regressed using a linear OLS against 
the main predictive variable, the likelihood of an interlock between two firms discussed 
earlier and presented as                                .  This 
variable, as discussed, represents the calculated value of the propensity, or likelihood, of 
observing an interlocking relationship based on the most significant firm and board 
characteristics previously discussed and presented in hypotheses 1-8.  In addition to the 
likelihood of interlock ratio, control variables for relative size and method of payment
27
 
will be incorporated into each regression. For robustness, the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns (CARs) will also be analyzed using observed (rather than predicted) interlock in 
this scenario the equation will be                             , where 
interlock is a dummy variable that takes on a value of 1 for an observed interlock and 0 
otherwise. 
In addition to testing for the effects of the propensity of having and interlocking 
relationships, the propensity of a “surprise” relationship, or lack thereof, was calculated 
and tested, for robustness purposes.  A surprise interlocking relationship, or its absence, is 
defined as the actual status of between two firms (0 if no interlocking relationship exists 
or 1 if there is an interlocking relationship) minus the predicted likelihood of an interlock 
between two firms.  Testing for the surprise occurrence of interlocks is meant to pick up 
the market’s response to a merger announcement between firms expected to have 
interlocks but are revealed not to have one, and / or between firms which are not expected 
to have an interlock and are discovered to have such a relationship between them. 
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 Because we will be analysing each firms CARs over both pre and post bid announcement windows, the 
method of payment variable will not be included in the CARs regressions that pertain to pre-announcement 
time since during that period no bid had been made and thus no method of payment exists since no payment 
has been made. 
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V. Sample and Data Collection 
The sample used in this study was compiled using three separate sources; the 
Securities Data Corp (SDC) Database, the Financial Post (FP) FP-Infomart Mergers 
Database, and Bureau Van Dijk’s Zephyr M&A Database.  Regardless of the data source 
used, the basic premise followed throughout the data collection process was to collect the 
following: all Canadian merger and / or acquisition deals announced between 1997 and 
2003 inclusively, for publicly traded firms and excluding all deals involving financial 
firms
28
 (target or bidder firms).  In addition all deal forms listed either as share buyback 
or acquisition of assets, were excluded, as well as any deals for which the target and / or 
the acquirer is listed as a public administration, telecommunication, or utility firm, as 
well as any deals where the acquiring firm effectively had control of the target, measured 
as a toehold greater than 50% of the target’s shares outstanding. The choice of date range 
was to incorporate two objectives: obtain director data and be able to examine long run 
post acquisition performance. The Canadian System for Electronic Document Analysis 
and Retrieval (SEDAR) was used to obtain proxy data.  Since this data source’s 
repository begins in 1997, that year served as the lower limit of our data range.  2003 was 
chosen as the upper end of the data spectrum to allow for at least five years to pass after 
the last deal in order for the newly merged firm to publish accounting and performance 
data which will be used to expand the scope of this study in future paper(s) 
Given the above criteria, the SDC database yielded a total of 613 transactions, 4,394 
deals were obtained for the FP-Infomart, and Zephyr provided an additional 1,021 viable 
deals after the removal of 109 deals which were missing either Acquirer or Target data.  
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 These types of firms were removed because the analysis of financial firm M&A is structurally different 
than that of other firms.  
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However, before beginning work on this amalgamated dataset, a thorough matching 
process was conducted between the various data sources in order to eliminate the 
inevitable overlaps in content.  Table 1 details the breakdown of the overlapping of 
content in matrix form.  Not surprisingly, due to the fact that the Zephyr is the most 
recently created of the three used the number of overlaps with this data source increase as 
we move forward in time. Table 2 provides these overlaps by the year in which the deal 
occurred and Table 3 illustrates the distribution of interlocking deals among bidders and 
targets over the seven year time span of this paper’s data.  After identifying all 
overlapping observations, the remaining sample was then matched to the Canadian 
Financial Markets Research Center (CFMRC) database to identify publically traded 
bidders and targets. In addition, because thin trading is often a limiting factor when 
working with Canadian data, this process helped eliminate all deals for which the deal 
participants did not have any documented market returns. 
Due to the use of three separate data sources, the variables of interest for each deal 
were not consistently found across all sources.  As such, the decision was made to build a 
mini-database containing the deal information
29
 for all transactions identified.  For this 
task, the Factiva and ProQuest databases where used to research news articles (news 
wire) announcing each deal, which were subsequently used to collect the necessary 
details for each transaction. A total of 10 deals were eliminated during this process due to 
the lack of information. Table 5, Table 6, and Table 7 report the summary statistics that 
characterize the firms within the sample, board attributes, and deal characteristics 
respectively; for all three tables, panel A breaks down the calculated statistics between 
interlocking and non-interlocking firms, whereas panel B repeats the process between 
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bidders and targets.  As a general trend, most deals, 88%, tended to be successful, with 
the highest rates of success occurring in 2001 after which the success rate declined 
slightly.  Deals characterized by escalation of bidding, hostility, and / or contestability 
accounted for only 14%, 11%, and 10% of all bids respectively over the 6 year period of 
this study.  Finally, the method of payment across deals was approximately equally 
divided among the cash, stock, or mixed payments. 
The last step taken before analyzing the data for this paper was to collect each firm’s 
director data.  This step called for the creation of another mini database since no formal 
data source provided the required set of variables for this study.  A list of these variables 
and their description, as mentioned previously in footnote, is provided in Table 4.  All 
director information was collected manually using company proxy statements filed with 
System for Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) as the main data 
source.  In the case when electronic proxies could not be located, the Blue Book of 
Canadian Business (1976-present) was used as a complementary second source of 
director information.  Table 8 details the breakdown of the director data sources and their 
uses. As Table 8 shows, the director information for both deal participants was obtained 
from the same data source for about 82% of the usable deals, i.e. deals where at least one 
participant’s information was found.  As per Table 8, 8 deals were eliminated during this 
process due the lack of director information available for both participants.  At the end of 
this information gathering process, a total of 353 firms (consisting of 124 unique 
acquirers, and 151 unique targets) were left creating a total of 220 deals.  
As a consequence of using a non-electronic data source, the proxy filings with 
SEDAR and the published material in the CCB, there is an inevitable difference between 
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each deal’s news wire announcement date and the date of the director information used.  
As such, only director data, from either source, published before the announcement date 
of each deal was used.  Table 9 presents these date differences, grouped by the year in 
which each deal was announced and by participant (acquirer or target).  Over the 6 year 
span of the data sample of this study, the average difference, or lag, between the acquirer 
and target firms’ director data and the announcement of the merger and / or acquisition 
deal they were involved in was about 147 days, or about 5 months for the acquiring firms, 
and about 200 days, or about 6     months, for target firms.  The classification of this 
paper’s sample is summarized in Table 10 which breaks down the distributions of 
interlocking and non-interlocking firms among both targets and acquirers, and Table 11 
which orders the sample firms into their respective industry of operation. 
VI. Results 
This section presents the results of testing the various hypotheses presented earlier.  In 
addition, this section also presents some general findings discovered while studying 
paper’s thesis pertaining to the Canadian M&A environment.  First, a general observation 
to note is the distribution of merger and / or acquisition activity in the years sampled in 
this thesis.  Table 3, as mentioned previously, presents the distribution of the sample data 
by the year in which each deal was announced.  As Table 3 shows, the number of merger 
and acquisition deals announced peaked in 2000, and dropped off sharply thereafter.  
Understandably, the timing of the drop of in merger activity in Canada coincided with the 
start of the 2001 recession period in the United States, as illustrated in Figure 1.  This is a 
poignant reflection of the impact that the U.S. economy has on Canadian capital markets, 
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despite the fact that all the deals in this particular sample are not cross border transactions 
but rather exclusively between Canadian firms. 
Another significant characteristic of Canadian M&A presented by Table 3, is the 
steadily rising proportion of deals in which the two parties have an interlocking 
relationship.  Overall, interlocking deals made up close to 19% of all merger deals in this 
paper’s sample.  Assuming that this paper’s sample is a fair representation of the overall 
merger activity in Canada, nearly a third, as of 2003, of all merger deals in Canada have 
some interlocking or overlapping of board members.  The argument could be made that 
these results are because the Canadian pool of qualified directors is small, thus firms have 
a smaller number of qualified directors from which to choose and as such interlocks are 
an inevitable consequence.  However, firms are not obligated to hire board directors from 
within their home nation.  Of the 353 firms in the current sample, only 103 of them had 
boards composed entirely of Canadian directors
30, 31
.  According to the research of Fama 
and Jensen, the role of outside directors can be summarized as follows; 
 They are professional referees whose task is to stimulate and oversee the 
competition among the firm's top management (Fama, 1980, p. 293). 
 They carry out tasks that involve serious agency problems between internal 
managers and residual claimants' (Fama and Jensen, 1983, p. 315). 
 They supply relevant complementary knowledge...to provide an important support 
function to the top managers in dealing with specialized decision problems' (Fama 
and Jensen, 1983, p. 315) 
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 Directors are designated as Canadian or Other based on their place of domicile as per company proxy 
statements filed with the Electronic Document Analysis and Retrieval (SEDAR) 
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 Only 5 firms had a board of directors composed exclusively of foreign nationals 
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Therefore, given the above benefits of outside directors coupled with the fact that 
firms are not obligated to hire from within their home country, the argument that 
Canadian firms should have more interlocking directors due to the fact that there is small 
pool of qualified Canadian directors is not a valid argument for the presence of this 
proportion of interlocks among Canadian boards
32
.  Thus this lends strength to the notion 
that not all directors are selected solely on the basis that their professional background / 
experience will be a beneficial and / or complimentary addition to a firm’s board.  If that 
were the case, firms should hire directors from across the globe
33
 in order to meet any 
predetermined experience / knowledge quotas they have set for their board and eschew 
the hiring of directors whom are also presiding on other firms’ boards. 
The rest of this section will be organized as follows; first, results of hypotheses and 
general findings pertaining to firm and board characteristics will be discussed, followed 
by a similar section dedicated to deal characteristics.  Lastly, results of hypotheses made 
for deal and portfolio returns will be presented and discussed. 
i. Firm and Board Characteristics 
First, Table 5 presents the univariate results for the test in the difference in firm size 
between interlocks and non-interlocks, Panel A, as well as Acquirer and Target firms, 
Panel B.  Results show that on average, non-interlocking acquiring firms are not 
significantly larger than their interlocking counter parts in either measure of firm size, the 
natural logarithm of firm market capitalization or relative size.  Alternatively, non-
interlocking target firms tend to be significantly larger (at 1%) than their interlocking 
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 Board meetings conducted over conference calls are an efficient and relatively cheap way of mitigating 
the costs associated with hiring directors from other nations. 
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counterparts as measured by their size relative to their acquiring firm.  This result gives 
credence to hypothesis presented earlier that interlocks should be more prevalent among 
the smallest of firms, who would be motivated to seek such a relationship in order to 
build a knowledge transfer network with larger more experienced firms in the market. 
Panel B’s results are consistent with M&A literature, and show that acquiring firms are 
significantly larger than their targets regardless of whether they have an interlocking 
relationship with their targets or not.  
Testing for Hypothesis 1 (H1), which speculated that the propensity of having and 
interlock will be negatively affected by firm size under the wealth maximization driver of 
interlocks and positively affected by firm size under the agency driver of interlocks, 
Table 12’s Logit results in fact show that the propensity to interlock increase significantly 
(at the 5% level) the smaller the firm size.  This is strong evidence in favour of the wealth 
maximization driver of interlocks, which argues that smaller firms are more likely form 
links with directors of larger firms in order to gain the experience and knowledge these 
top managers have gained in order to use this knowledge to better compete (and thus 
increase their shareholder’s wealth) in a market place where their size leaves them at a 
distinct competitive disadvantage.  These results confirm those found by Haunschild and 
Beckman (1998) showing that the effects of interlocks often are most profound for the 
smaller, rather than the larger of the interlocking pairs.  As such, smaller firms –i.e. 
usually the targets – tend to have more interlocks than their larger acquirers 
Next, Table 6 presents the univariate results for the test in the difference of means of 
various board characteristics between interlocks and non-interlocks, Panel A, as well as 
Acquirer and Target firms, Panel B.  First, the difference between the fraction 
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interlocking and non-interlocking board made up of local (i.e. Canadian) directors is not 
significant, indicating that the fraction interlocking and non-interlocking firms’ boards 
made up of local directors is approximately the same. This result is also true when this 
test is conducted between acquirer and target firms rather than interlocks versus non-
interlocks.  These results are interesting because assuming that the larger the firm
34
 the 
more resources it should have at its disposal to search for, locate, and convince top 
executives to join its board, then the significantly larger Acquiring firms (see Table 5) 
should have a higher percentage of their board represented by foreign directors – 
assuming their objective is to hire the best. 
Coincidentally, Table 6 provides more interesting information about the makeup of 
Canadian boards and sheds some light as to the reason behind who is chosen to take up 
these positions.  On average, Canadian target firms have the same percentage of their 
board made up of outside, inside, and grey directors 
35
 as their acquiring counterparts; 
however target firms that do have an interlocking directorship (Panel A) have a 
significantly larger percentage their board made up of outside and grey directors. 
These results, coupled with the results in Table 6 showing that the significantly 
smaller target firms on average compensate their directors no less than the much larger 
acquiring firms, in terms of annual retainers and meeting fees, suggests that small 
Canadian firms’ choice of interlocks is focused on attracting not just any director with 
knowledge and expertise, or even connections to a large and powerful firm, but rather a 
director with knowledge and social connections specific to Canada.  Furthermore, and 
lending further support to Hypothesis 1, Panel C Table 6 shows that overall, interlocking 
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 A grey director is defined as a director with a past relationship with the firm, i.e. past executive, 
employee etc. 
49 
target firms have a higher proportion of their boards made up of interlocking directors 
relative to their acquirers.  This difference is significant at the 10% level. 
Continuing with Table 6 panel E, univariate results show that acquiring firms, 
compared to target firms, predictably, have larger boards, with the difference being 
significant at the 1% level.  On average, acquiring firms have approximately 8 people on 
their boards compared to approximately 7 for target firms.  Between non-interlocking 
acquirers and targets, the difference in board size is significant at the 1% level, whereas 
between interlocking acquirers and targets the difference is observed to be significant at 
the 5% level.  In addition, panel D of the same table clearly shows that interlocking 
targets have significantly more (at the 10% level) board members than non-interlocking 
targets.  This result is consistent with the results of Panel C, in that it explains how 
interlocking firms have a significantly higher proportion of their boards made up of 
interlocking directors.  The higher percentage is due to the hiring of additional directors, 
most or all of whom are directors of other firms. 
With respect to the number of women present on Canadian boards, there is no 
statistical difference between the percentage of women present on the boards of targets 
(3.60%) and acquirers (4.15%), with the overall sample average being 3.89%.  This 
relationship holds between interlocking and non-interlocking acquirer and target pairs.  
However, when comparing all interlocking targets versus all non-interlocking targets, 
Table 6 panel A shows that interlocking targets have about 7% of their board seats 
occupied by women compared to just 3% for target firms that do not have interlocking 
directorates; a difference that is significant at the 1% level.  This suggests that, perhaps, 
the additional number of directors that interlocking targets have in comparison to non-
50 
interlocking targets (as per the results of Panel D) are mainly composed of female 
directors.  It is worthwhile to note that the percentage of women found serving the board 
of directors of Canadian firms is much lower than the % value quoted by the Catalyst’s36 
2007 edition of the “Catalysts Canada Census of Women Corporate Officers and Top 
Earners of Canada”.  Of the 353 firms in the current sample, 260 (≈74%) of them had no 
women on their board, 87 (≈24.65%) had one woman among their board members, and 
only 6 (≈0.02%) had more than two women serving on their boards; these values are 
different than the one reported by Catalysts’, which were 43.2%, 28.2%, and 28.6% 
respectively.  Catalysts’ values, however, were calculated only from among Financial 
Post 500 (FP500) companies, whereas this paper’s sample is non-discriminatory and thus 
included firms across Canada, regardless of size. 
Table 6 also sheds light on the tenure of Canadian directors.  Although panel B of 
Table 6 shows no difference in director tenure between acquirers and targets (both about 
6 ½ years), there is a significant difference in the time directors spend on the board of an 
interlocking acquirers versus a non-interlocking acquirer.  Directors serving on the boards 
of acquirer firms with interlocking directorates appear to be more entrenched, spending 
on average about 8 years on the board versus only 6 for directors on the board of 
acquiring firms with no interlocking directorships; a difference that is significant at the 
1% level.  Conversely this difference in tenure does not exist between interlocking and 
non-interlocking target boards.  This appears to provide further support for the wealth 
maximization driver of interlocks; in order to gain access to experience and information, 
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smaller Canadian firms tend to target outside, but local, directors to occupy seats on their 
boards – these directors are often long tenured board members of much larger firms that 
eventually become interested in acquiring the smaller firms on which their entrenched 
directors also serve (interlocked directors). This proposition supports both the 
aforementioned financial health / resource dependency theory, which argues that firms’ 
main goal is to acquire the resources, be they raw materials or financial, necessary for 
survival, as well as the knowledge transfer theory. 
Lastly, Table 6 shows that there is no difference in the average proportion of outside, 
inside, or grey directors between interlocked and non-interlocked acquiring firms.  This 
situation is duplicated with respect to interlocking and non-interlocking acquiring firms, 
save one difference; interlocking acquiring firms have a significantly higher proportion 
(at 1%) of grey directors serving on their boards than non-interlocking acquirers. As 
presented in Hypothesis 6 earlier, a higher proportion of grey directors is indicative of the 
wealth maximization driver of interlocking relationships in M&A. 
Given the univariate observations from Table 6, and Hypotheses 2-8 expressed 
previously, Table 13 addresses each of those hypothesis in order to determine which 
underlying theory, agency or wealth maximization, is the one the most likely drives the 
creation of interlocking boards in Canadian merger partners.  Once again, as in Table 12, 
the regressions presented in this table are Logit regressions, where Interlock is a 1 or 0 
variable representing whether a portfolio
37
 made up of the merger pair has an interlocking 
relationship or not.  In total, 119 portfolios were created; consisting of complete data 
(stock return and board information) for both firms.  Of these 119 portfolios (each 
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merger pair, with the weight of each firm in the portfolio equal to the natural logarithm of its market 
capitalization relative to the natural logarithm of both firms’ market capitalization together. 
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representing one deal), 24 of them were between firms that had an interlocking 
relationship with each other.  With respect to Hypothesis 2 and 3, regressions 1 and 2 in 
Table 13 shows that the percentage of direct voting shares owned by directors and the 
percentage of the board that is compensated with options, have no significant impact on 
the propensity of a merger pair having an interlocking relationship between them.  As 
hypothesized earlier, a significantly negative or non-significant coefficients for either of 
these variables is indicative of the agency driver of interlocks
38
.  Regressions 3, 6, and 7 
of this table shows the predicted signs for board member tenure, proportion of grey 
directors, and proportion of female directors respectively, as the ones predicted to be 
observed in the scenario that interlocks are driven by shareholder wealth maximization 
incentives rather than management agency.  Longer tenured boards, a large proportion of 
grey directors, and a larger proportion of women is shown to significantly increase the 
propensity to interlock between the two merging firms.  The proportion of inside 
directors, regression 5, was found to have no effect on the propensity to interlock 
between firms, and this result is inconsistent with both the wealth maximization and 
agency theories.  Lastly, the fraction of outside directors was found to negatively affect 
the propensity of observing an interlock between firms, and this is consistent with the 
predicted sign in Hypothesis 5 under the agency driver of interlocks.  However, when all 
the variables with significant coefficients are combined into one regression, regression 
number 8, to predict the propensity of observing an interlock this variable loses its 
significance and thus removes an element of support for the agency driver of interlocks. 
In summary, Table 13 presented eight Logit regressions to answer the seven 
hypotheses presented earlier, in order to ascertain which driver behind the creating of 
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interlocks, agency or wealth maximization, is most likely.  The results have shown that 
the agency theory is supported by the results of Hypotheses 2 and 3, whereas the wealth 
maximization theory is supported by results of Hypotheses 4, 7, and 8. Hypothesis 6 
supported neither theory, whereas the number of outside directors (Hypothesis 5) showed 
support for the agency theory only when used as the only explanatory variable in the 
model, but did not show support for either theory when combined within a general Logit 
regression predicting the propensity to interlock.  As such, Table 13 provides a scant edge 
to the theory that Canadian interlocks are driven primarily by wealth maximization 
incentives rather than agency ones.  As described earlier in the methodology section, the 
most significant variables predicting interlocks will be combined to form an aggregate 
equation describing the likelihood of observing an interlock.  Through the results of Table 
13 the six most significant interlock predictors were grouped into the following equation; 
                                                                      
                                 
ii. Deal Characteristics 
Table 14a (Panels A-H)
39
 detail the results of Hypotheses 9-16, and provide 
convincing evidence for the notion that interlocking directorates in Canada are more 
likely to be created between firms with wealth maximization intentions rather than 
agency driven incentives.  The Logit regression presented in Panel A indicates that deals 
with the propensity of having an interlock are no more successful at being consummated 
that deals without an interlock, in line with the hypotheses that when an interlock is 
created on the basis of wealth maximization, there should be no further guarantee that the 
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earlier Hypothesis & Methodology Section for details).  Results, presented in this table are similar to those 
found above in Table 14a 
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two firms will eventually consummate their relationship formally.  In support of this 
finding, the results of the Logit regressions in Panel B, C, and D show that the propensity 
of observing deal escalation, deal contests, and hostility between the firms is as likely in 
deals with interlocks as in deals without interlocks. These results run counter to 
hypotheses 10, 11, and 12 which argued that when a deal is announced between 
interlocking firms whose relationship was known (or rumoured) to be based on agency 
motives that such negative aspects of the merger process will be suppressed since there 
should already be an “understanding” between the management of both firms. 
Consistent with the predictions of hypotheses 13 and 14 the propensity of observing a 
toehold among interlocks is significantly (at 1%) greater than among deals without an 
interlock (Panel E), and the expected value of the fraction of toehold held by the 
acquiring firms is also significantly greater (also at 1%) than would otherwise be 
observed with deals without an interlocking relationship between the merging parties 
(Panel F).  As per Panel F, on average, acquiring firms that have an interlocking 
relationship with their targets own approximately 23% share of those targets before the 
merger announcement.  This ownership value is larger than the 20% average reported by 
Betton, Eckbo, and Thorburn (2007).  However, it is important to note that of the 119 
portfolios used, only 14 (11.76%) deals were such that the acquiring firm held a toehold 
within the target.  This ratio is comparable to the 13% value reported by Betton, Eckbo, 
and Thorburn (2007). Among portfolios (deals) with an interlocking relationship, the 
ratio of those that own a toe hold is 10/24 or approximately 42%. From the above data, 
we see that toeholds are infrequent in the general takeover world but are very frequent 
(and large) when there is an interlocking board. 
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Panel G presents the OLS regression for the expected bid premium given the 
propensity of an interlock between the two merging firms.  As predicted in the wealth 
maximization scenario for interlocks in hypothesis 15, the expected bid premium among 
deals with interlocks is not significantly different from those without such a relationship.  
This lends credence to the argument that the management of target firms with a wealth 
maximizing interlocking relationship still retain the choice of rejecting a bid from its 
interlocked partner if such a bid undervalued the firm. 
Lastly, Panels H Table 14a present the Logit regression for the propensity of bid 
payments being made in cash, given the likelihood of an interlock between the merging 
firms.  The results of these regressions also confirm the wealth maximization arguments 
made in Hypotheses 16 which argues that because the interlocking relationship allows the 
bidding firm to learn more about its target, and thus its true value, then cash bids should 
be more likely.  Panel H indeed shows that given the propensity to interlock, cash bids 
are significantly more likely (at 1%). 
iii. Deal and Portfolio Returns 
To finally answer the main hypothesis of this paper; do mergers between interlocking 
firms result in higher returns for investors, the results of Tables 19 and 20 indicate that 
indeed, mergers among interlocking firms yield positive returns..  Over a 60 day window, 
deals among interlocking firms returned an average of 8% more (significant at 5%) than 
comparable non-interlocking firms based on calculations of cumulative abnormal returns 
(CAR) and 13% more than non-interlocking firms based on buy and hold (BHAR) 
calculations. 
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Tables 21a to 23a
40
 address the theories postulated in section IV, wherein it was 
proposed that, for a period before the announcement date (-30,-1), the propensity of 
having an interlocking relationship between two independent firms, will have a 
significantly positive effect on Target firms’ returns – as investors price in the benefits of 
the Target firms’ invitations of directors from bigger, more resource and network rich 
firms, to sit on their boards.  In addition, it was proposed that for the period around the 
announcement day (-1, 1) the difference in returns between interlocking Acquirers and 
Targets should not be significantly different than 0, because the market should not be 
surprised by a merger announcement from among such firms since their interlocking 
relationship was announced to the market prior to the merger announcement.  Lastly, 
interlocking Acquirer firms should exhibit significantly positive returns in comparison to 
their Target after the merger announcement (proxied in this paper by a [0, +60] day 
window) presumably because they succeeded in acquiring firms with whom they are  
familiar and thus avoided overpaying for their purchase. 
The results of Tables 21a to 23a do not completely support all the theories postulated 
in section IV.  Table 21a for example shows that 30 days before a merger announcement, 
the propensity to interlocking relationship had no significant impact on Acquirer or 
Portfolio returns, but had significantly (at 1%) negative returns on Target returns.  
Alternatively, Portfolio returns seem to be positively (at 5% significance) related to the 
propensity of a surprising interlock one month before any merger announcement; Table 
22a shows similar results.  However, Tables 23a, which tests for Acquirer, Target and 
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 For robustness purposes, Tables 21b-23b presents analyzes the same variables discussed in Tables 21a-
23a, but used the observed interlock variable as the primary predictor, rather than the likelihood of an 
interlock (please see earlier Hypothesis & Methodology Section for details).  Results, presented in this table 
are similar to those found above in Tables 21a-23a 
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Portfolio returns for the two months after the announcement of any merger deals between 
the firms, shows that Portfolio returns were positively and significantly (at 5%) effected 
by the propensity to interlock between the two merging firms, with the propensity of a 
surprise interlock having no effect on the Portfolio returns over the same period. 
VII. Discussion and Recommendations  
This paper, drawing its sample from among Canadian mergers and acquisitions 
activity from 1997-2003, addressed the question of whether the existence of an 
interlocking relationship, defined as the situation in which two firms share one or more 
board members, has any effect on the performance of acquirers, targets, or both in the 
specific event of a merger between them.  
The paper began by introducing some of the most prominent literature on the topic of 
interlocks, namely the work focusing on the inter-organizational and intra-class analysis 
of this phenomenon.  Further research was also presented on why interlocks exist, within 
the context of the Inter-Organizational and Intra-Class analysis. Two drivers for the 
existence of interlocks, Management Agency and Shareholder Wealth Maximization, 
were discussed, as well as their underlying attributes, being firm size, management 
control, and class hegemony in the case of the Agency theory, and firm size, financial 
health / resource dependency, and knowledge transfer needs in the case of the 
Shareholder Wealth Maximization argument.  In addition, the most prominent legislative 
acts governing interlocks in Canada as well as in the United States (Canada’s largest 
trading partner) were introduced and their relevance to this paper’s thesis was discussed. 
The results of this paper, which also included general findings on the state of boards 
in Canada, showed that interlocking relationships have been on the rise in Canada since 
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the turn of the new century, with the latest data showing nearly 20% of all Canadian firms 
having an interlocking relationship as represented by a shared director on their board.  It 
was also found that, on average, interlocking acquiring firms tend to have significantly 
longer tenured board members than non-interlocking acquirers, whereas interlocking 
targets have a significantly higher percentage of women and grey directors on their, as 
well as a higher number of large shareholders.  In addition, although there was no 
significant difference in the number of directors on interlocking and non-interlocking 
acquiring firms’ board, these boards were always larger than their target counterparts.  
However, among targets, interlocking firms had significantly larger boards, suggesting 
that the difference could be the interlocking board member – added to the already 
established board in order for the target firm to benefit from his / her experience and 
social connectivity.  With respect to deal characteristics, interlocking deals were found to 
be likely to succeed, have a higher frequency and level of toeholds, use cash more 
frequently, and have significantly lower rates of deal contestation in comparison to their 
non-interlocking counterparts. 
In testing this paper’s main thesis, it was found that the propensity of having an 
interlocking relationship between any two firms was negatively related to firm size, and 
positively related to board member tenure, their relationship to the firms (insider and 
grey), as well as their gender (women).  These attributes were used to develop an 
aggregate probably of interlocks among firms, which in turn was used to explain deal 
characteristics such as success rates, method of payment, deal attitude, and bid premium.  
The propensity to interlock was found to be a significant variable in explaining deal 
status, the observation of toeholds among the merging parties, the percentage of toehold 
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owned by the acquiring firm prior to biding for the target, as well as the choice of using 
cash as a payment method.  Continuing to use this aggregate likelihood of observing an 
interlock, evidence from the cumulative abnormal returns, as well as buy-and-hold 
returns, of portfolios created from the stocks of the merged firms indicated that over the 
approximately two months following the announcement of a merger deal between two 
Canadian firms, those that had an interlocking relationship before the announcement 
performed significantly better (between 11% and 13%), than the firms which did not have 
such a relationship between their boards. 
Based on these results, it appears that the interlocking board phenomenon is 
something that is valued among market participants, even though it is often regarded with 
a degree of mistrust by lawmakers and others.  The reservations against interlocking 
boards stem from the argument that interlocking boards can be misused to the detriment 
of shareholders as a whole.  This argument, however, can be applied to many other 
characteristics of corporate governance.  However, since interlocking boards do provide 
benefits to shareholders, it would be in the interest of those shareholders to monitor their 
designated boards’ action when such a relationship occurs.   
The topic of mergers between interlocking firms will undoubtedly benefit from further 
research for two crucial reasons; one, in order to examine many of the preconceived 
notions of insider manipulation and agency many have when confronted with this subject, 
and second, to learn more about the mechanics behind these kinds of relationship in order 
to better utilize them to the benefit of shareholders. With respect to this paper, its findings 
have the potential to be expanded and generalized by expanding the sample size of 
interlocking mergers studies as well as by investigating the performance of mergers 
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among interlocked firms in various other countries.  In addition, researching the 
behaviour of stock price run-up and mark-up with respect to deal consisting of 
interlocking target and acquirer firms is another avenue of research worth considering, as 
well as that which studies the long-run performance of the merged interlocks relative to 
merged firms who were not interlock before their combination. 
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Tables 
Table 1: Sample Deals – Source Overlaps 
 
  SDC Zephyr FP 
SDC 612 . . 
Zephyr 97 1130 . 
FP 284 196 4394 
 









1997 2 48 0 
1998 1 42 2 
1999 2 54 2 
2000 6 49 14 
2001 28 43 49 
2002 35 33 69 
2003 23 15 60 
Total 97 284 196 
 
 







% of % of 
 
N 
% % of 
N % 
All Non-Interlocks Year's Sample All Interlocks Year's Sample 
1997 44 15.28% 91.67% 
 
4 6.15% 8.33% 48 13.60% 
1998 36 12.50% 83.72% 
 
7 10.77% 16.28% 43 12.18% 
1999 48 16.67% 81.36% 
 
11 16.92% 18.64% 59 16.71% 
2000 59 20.49% 86.76% 
 
9 13.85% 13.24% 68 19.26% 
2001 50 17.36% 79.37% 
 
13 20.00% 20.63% 63 17.85% 
2002 29 10.07% 69.05% 
 
13 20.00% 30.95% 42 11.90% 
2003 22 7.64% 73.33% 
 
8 12.31% 26.67% 30 8.50% 
Total 288 100.00% 81.59% 
 




Table 4: Variable Descriptions 
 
Variables Description 
Panel A: Firm Characteristics 
natres 0= Natural Resource Firm 0 = Otherwise 
mrktcap_min31 Firm Market Capitalization (CA$) 
 
ln_mrktcap Natural Log of Firm Market Capitalization 
relsize Firm Relative Size 
 
   
Panel B: Deal Characteristics 
dateannou(nw) Announcement Date (New Wire data) 
 
yr1997 Dummy Year 1997 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr1998 Dummy Year 1998 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr1999 Dummy Year 1999 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr2000 Dummy Year 2000 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr2001 Dummy Year 2001 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr2002 Dummy Year 2002 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
yr2003 Dummy Year 2003 = 1 0 = Otherwise 
dealstatus Completed Deal = 1 0 = Otherwise 
stock Stock Deal = 1 0 = Otherwise 
cash Cash Deal = 1 0 = Otherwise 
mix Mixed Payment Deal = 1 0 = Otherwise 
prctcash % of Deal Paid In Cash 
 
prctstock % of Deal Paid In Stock 
 
prctsought % of Target Sought 
 
toehold Toehold = 1 0 = Otherwise 
prcttoehold Percent Toehold Existing 
 
prctafterdeal % of Target Owned After the Deal  
p/s Event Day Price per Share (CA$) 
 
dealvalue$CA Deal Value (CA$) 
 
debt$CA Deal Debt (CA$) 
 
dealvalue+debt$CA Total Deal Value (CA$) 
 
support Deal Supported by Target = 1 0 = Otherwise 
escalation Escalation In Negotiation = 1 0 = Otherwise 
hostile Hostile Bid = 1 0 = Otherwise 
contested Contested Bid = 1 0 = Otherwise 
price_ed Event Day Price (CA$) 
 
price_min31 Firm Price on Day -31 (CA$) 
 
premium Premium Paid (Percent) 
 
diversified Merger / Acq. Across Industries = 1 0 = Otherwise 
Panel C: Board Characteristics 
acq/tar Acquirer = 0 Target = 1 
totaldirectors Total Number of Directors on Board 
 
women Women On Board = 1 0 = Otherwise 
avgwomen Average Number of Women on Board (Percent) 
total1stdegree 1st Degree Connection = 1 0 = Otherwise 
total2nddegree 2nd Degree Connection = 1 0 = Otherwise 
interlock Interlock = 1 0 = Otherwise 
avgca Average Number of Canadians On Board (Percent) 
allca All Canadian Board =1 0 = Otherwise 
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avgother Average Number of Foreigners On Board (Percent) 
allother All Foreigner Board = 1 0 = Otherwise 
mixedb Mixed Board = 1 0 = Otherwise 
avgnumpos Average Number of Board Members Currently Employed By the Firm 
avgaudit Average Number of Directors on the Audit Committee 
avgcomp Average Number of Directors on the Compensation Committee 
avgnomgov Average Number of Directors on the Nominating & Governance Committee 
avgcommperdir Average Number of Committee Spots Occupied Per Director 
ceochair CEO = Chair =1 Otherwise = 0 
avginsiders Average Number of Inside Directors 
avgoutsiders Average Number of Outside Directors 
avggrey Average Number of Grey Directors 
avgtimeonboard Average Time Spent On the Board (Years) 
%-mvod % of Multiple Voting Shares Outstanding - Directly Held By Board Members 
%-mvoid % of Multiple Voting Shares Outstanding - Indirectly Held By Board Members 
%-vod % of Voting Shares Outstanding - Directly Held By Board Members 
%-void % of Voting Shares Outstanding - Indirectly Held By Board Members 
%-nonvod % of Non Voting Shares Outstanding - Directly Held By Board Members 
%-nonvoid % of Non Voting Shares Outstanding - Indirectly Held By Board Members 
avg retainer Average Retainer 
avg meetfee Average Meeting Fee 
meetfeeprctofret Meeting Fee as a % of Retainer 
prctw/stockcomp % of Board With Stock Compensation 
total ps Total Number of Principle Shareholders 
%-ps-mvod % of Multiple Voting Shares Outstanding - Directly Held By Principle Shareholders 
%-ps-vod % of Voting Shares Outstanding - Directly Held By Principle Shareholders 





Table 5: Sample Variables Descriptive Statistics – Firm Characteristics 
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Table 6: Sample Variables Descriptive Statistics – Board Characteristics 
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 Time on Board: The average time (in years) a director has spent serving on a particular board. 
42
 Principle Shareholders: Shareholders who own more than 5% of each respective firm. 
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 Although the Full Sample count of acquirer and target firms should be equal, the lack of information for 
some target firms resulted in a divergence between the total number of target and acquire firms.    
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Table 7: Sample Variables Descriptive Statistics – Deal Characteristics 
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Table 8: Sample Director Information Source Breakdown 
 
 
Acquirer SEDAR Acquirer CBB Acquirer No Info 
 
Target SEDAR 290 20 5 315 
Target CBB 7 6 3 16 
Target No Info 15 7 0 22 
 
312 33 8 353 
 































Min 27 136 
 
59 27 




















Min -2 37 
 
3 52 




















Min -150 146 
 
7 24 




















Min -67 12 
 
-34 34 




















Min 13 7 
 
5 32 




















Min 2 0 
 
7 22 
























Table 10: Interlocking vs. Non-Interlocking Deal Breakdown 
 
 
Non-Interlock Interlock Total 
Acquirer 154 34 188 
Target 134 31 165 
Total 288 65 353 
 
















236 24 11 8 8 9 20 37 353 
66.86% 6.80% 3.12% 2.27% 2.27% 2.55% 7.08% 10.48% 100% 
 
 The natural resources category included all firms that operated in the extraction and preparation of 
natural resources (including forestry) as well as those firms that serviced them 
 The financial services category does not include any banks or other financial institution, but rather 
service company such as income trusts and investment funds 
 The pulp and paper category includes all publishers 
 The computer technology includes all data and software firms 
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Table 12: Propensity to Interlock given Firm Characteristics, calculated using Logit regression in the form of 
               β
 
                 β
 
           β
 
          
 (1) 
 Interlock 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.232 
 (2.26)** 
Relative Size 0.017 
 (0.73) 





Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Table 13: Propensity to Interlock given Board Characteristics, calculated using Logit regression in the form of 
                                     for each of the eight regressions. 
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Interlock Interlock Interlock Interlock Interlock Interlock Interlock Interlock 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.131 -0.148 -0.201 -0.127 -0.165 -0.185 -0.169 -0.226 
 (1.35) (1.58) (2.02)** (1.34) (1.73)* (1.97)** (1.82)* (2.22)** 
Director Ownership 1.047        
 (1.05)        
% w/ Stock Comp  -0.561       
  (1.31)       
Avg. TOB   0.134     0.119 
   (2.68)***     (2.34)** 




   (2.37)**   
 
(0.26) 
% Insiders     -0.708  
  
 
    (0.57)  
  
% Grey      3.983  3.026 
      (3.72)***  (1.95)* 
% Women    
 
  4.511 3.752 
    
 
  (2.42)** (1.82)* 
Nat. Res Co. 0.204 0.345 0.192 0.368 0.270 0.363 0.260 0.278 
 (0.59) (1.00) (0.55) (1.05) (0.79) (1.03) (0.76) (0.75) 
Constant 0.911 1.741 1.451 2.209 1.813 1.397 1.487 1.562 
 (0.50) (0.98) (0.80) (1.23) (0.97) (0.81) (0.86) (0.84) 
Observations 233 227 229 233 236 233 238 229 
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses 





Table 14a: Logit & OLS regression results for Select Deal Characteristics given the likelihood of an interlocking 
relationship. The dependent variable for all models is the likelihood of an interlock, defined as                
β
 
                 β
 
          β
 
             β
 
         β
 
         β
 
              .  
Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
 
Panel A: Deal Completion (Logit Regression) 
 












































Panel F: Average Toehold (OLS Regression) 
  



























Table 14b: Logit & OLS regression results for Select Deal Characteristics given an Interlocking Relationship. The 
dependent variable for all models is the observed interlock, which takes on a value of 1 when an interlock exists 
between two merging firms and 0 otherwise.  Absolute value of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Panel A: Deal Completion (Logit Regression) 
 
 Deal Status 
Interlock - 
 - 
Ln(Market Cap) 0.308 
 (1.93)* 











Ln(Market Cap) 0.065 
 (0.63) 











Ln(Market Cap) 0.205 
 (1.58) 











Ln(Market Cap) 0.093 
 (0.82) 











Ln(Market Cap) -0.051 
 (0.44) 






Panel F: Average Toehold (OLS Regression) 
 
 % Toehold 
Interlock 0.113 
 (9.57)*** 
Ln(Market Cap) -0.000 
 (0.03) 











Ln(Market Cap) -0.032 
 (0.93) 











Ln(Market Cap) -0.029 
 (0.36) 















Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
Acquirer 
[-30,-1] 188 0.02 0.01 0.74 0.16 -0.51 
 
154 0.02 0.01 0.69 0.15 -0.51 
 
34 0.04 0.02 0.74 0.22 -0.29 
[-1,+1] 186 -0.01 -0.02 0.26 0.08 -0.28 
 
153 -0.01 -0.02 0.25 0.08 -0.28 
 
33 0.01 0.01 0.26 0.09 -0.22 
[0,+60] 188 -0.09 -0.08 1.55 0.30 -1.09 
 
154 -0.10 -0.09 1.55 0.29 -1.09 
 
34 -0.03 0.00 0.51 0.30 -0.95 
                     
Target 
[-30,-1] 165 0.05 0.07 0.82 0.24 -0.78 
 
134 0.05 0.07 0.82 0.23 -0.72 
 
31 0.05 0.11 0.69 0.29 -0.78 
[-1,+1] 164 0.16 0.12 1.09 0.21 -0.50 
 
133 0.16 0.12 0.87 0.21 -0.50 
 
31 0.14 0.09 1.09 0.23 -0.17 
[0,+60] 165 0.18 0.17 1.59 0.38 -1.12 
 
134 0.18 0.16 1.59 0.34 -0.76 
 
31 0.16 0.17 1.53 0.50 -1.12 
 









Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
Acquirer 
[-30,-1] 188 0.01 0.00 0.90 0.18 -0.44 
 
154 0.01 -0.01 0.90 0.17 -0.44 
 
34 0.02 0.01 0.79 0.23 -0.36 
[-1,+1] 186 -0.01 -0.02 0.27 0.08 -0.27 
 
153 -0.02 -0.02 0.22 0.07 -0.27 
 
33 0.01 0.01 0.27 0.09 -0.22 
[0,+60] 188 -0.14 -0.11 1.74 0.33 -1.19 
 
154 -0.15 -0.12 1.74 0.33 -1.19 
 
34 -0.07 -0.06 0.54 0.31 -1.10 
                     
Target 
[-30,-1] 165 0.01 0.03 1.16 0.28 -0.93 
 
134 0.02 0.04 1.16 0.27 -0.93 
 
31 -0.01 -0.02 0.80 0.30 -0.78 
[-1,+1] 164 0.16 0.11 1.30 0.22 -0.45 
 
133 0.16 0.12 0.84 0.21 -0.45 
 
31 0.14 0.10 1.30 0.26 -0.26 
[0,+60] 165 0.07 0.11 2.13 0.67 -4.43 
 
134 0.08 0.11 1.17 0.57 -4.43 
 
31 0.01 0.09 2.13 0.99 -3.76 
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Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
Portfolios 
[-30,-1] 119 0.02 0.02 0.78 0.18 -0.43 
 
95 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.17 -0.43 
 
24 0.04 0.02 0.70 0.22 -0.26 
[-1,+1] 119 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.10 -0.23 
 
95 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.09 -0.23 
 
24 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.10 -0.15 
[0,+60] 119 -0.04 -0.02 0.81 0.26 -1.01 
 
95 -0.06 -0.04 0.80 0.25 -1.01 
 
24 0.03 0.01 0.81 0.28 -0.47 
                     









Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
 
Obs Mean Median Max St.Dev Min 
Acquirer 
[-30,-1] 119 0.02 0.02 0.78 0.18 -0.43 
 
95 0.01 0.02 0.78 0.17 -0.43 
 
24 0.04 0.02 0.70 0.22 -0.26 
[-1,+1] 119 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.10 -0.23 
 
95 0.02 0.02 0.55 0.09 -0.23 
 
24 0.03 0.02 0.26 0.10 -0.15 
[0,+60] 119 -0.04 -0.02 0.81 0.26 -1.01 
 
95 -0.06 -0.04 0.80 0.25 -1.01 
 
24 0.03 0.01 0.81 0.28 -0.47 
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 Note: as each portfolio consists of 2 firms, the number of observations listed is double the number of portfolios, 
thus there is in fact only 95 portfolios whose firms have no interlocks, and 24 portfolios whose firms are interlocked.  
These values add up to 119 portfolios; equal to the value reported earlier in the Hypothesis & Methodology section. 
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Table 21a: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (-30,-1).  For 
Panels A, C, E the model used is                                                       , where P(Interlocked) is 
the calculated likelihood of an interlock, defined as                                                                          
                           .                                                                 , for panels B, D, 
and F where P(Surprise Interlock) is equal to the observed interlock (0 or 1) minus P(Interlock).  Absolute value of z-statistics in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 











Panel B: Acquirer CARs 
 
 CAR(-30,-1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.056 
 (1.29) 



















Panel D: Target CARs 
 
 CAR(-30,-1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.017 
 (0.26) 


















Panel F: Portfolio P.CARs 
 
 P.CAR(-30,-1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.060 
 (2.06)** 








Table 21b: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (-30,-1).  For 
Panels A, B, C the model used is                                                      , where Interlocked is the 
observed interlock, which takes on a value of 1 when an interlock exists between two merging firms and 0 otherwise.  Absolute value 
of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.  This table is presented as a robustness 
check for the results presented in Panels A, C, E of Table 21a. 
 





Ln(Market Cap) -0.015 
 (1.68)* 














Ln(Market Cap) 0.017 
 (0.99) 














Ln(Market Cap) -0.001 
 (0.24) 










Table 22a: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (-1,+1).  For 
Panels A, C, E the model used is                                                      , where P(Interlocked) is the 
calculated likelihood of an interlock, defined as                                                                          
                           .                                                               , for panels B, D, and 
F where P(Surprise Interlock) is equal to the observed interlock (0 or 1) minus P(Interlock).  Absolute value of z-statistics in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Interlock) 0.045 0.011 
 (0.67) (0.16) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.66)  
Diversified  0.025 
  (1.28) 
Cash  0.012 
  (0.61) 
%Toehold  0.083 
  (0.83) 
Constant -0.021 -0.027 
 (1.42) (1.73)* 
Observations 113 113 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 
Panel B: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.032 0.022 
 (1.52) (0.94) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.95)  
Diversified  0.026 
  (1.30) 
Cash  0.012 
  (0.58) 
%Toehold  0.040 
  (0.37) 
Constant -0.013 -0.024 
 (1.58) (1.72)* 
Observations 113 113 
R-squared 0.02 0.04 
 
Panel C: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Interlock) -0.231 -0.183 
 (1.69)* (1.17) 
Relative Size 0.011  
 (0.66)  
Diversified  -0.063 
  (1.26) 
Cash  -0.015 
  (0.31) 
%Toehold  -0.198 
  (0.74) 
Constant 0.198 0.222 
 (4.79)*** (5.50)*** 
Observations 114 115 
R-squared 0.03 0.05 
Panel D: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.031 0.069 
 (0.54) (1.15) 
Relative Size 0.014  
 (0.80)  
Diversified  -0.064 
  (1.29) 
Cash  -0.0.31 
  (0.67) 
%Toehold  -0.437 
  (1.64) 
Constant 0.145 0.194 
 (5.31)*** (6.81)*** 
Observations 114 115 
R-squared 0.01 0.05 
 
Panel E: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 P.CAR(-1,+1) P.CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Interlock) 0.038 0.062 
 (0.84) (1.22) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (1.02)  
Diversified  -0.003 
  (0.19) 
Cash  -0.022 
  (1.47) 
%Toehold  -0.006 
  (0.07) 
Constant 0.016 0.017 
 (1.40) (1.39) 
Observations 228 229 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
Panel F: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 P.CAR(-1,+1) P.CAR(-1,+1) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.017 0.015 
 (0.99) (0.82) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (1.16)  
Diversified  -0.003 
  (0.21) 
Cash  -0.018 
  (1.23) 
%Toehold  -0.004 
  (0.04) 
Constant 0.024 0.029 
 (3.72)*** (3.29)*** 
Observations 228 229 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
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Table 22b: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (-1,+1).  For 
Panels A, B C the model used is                                                     , where Interlocked is the 
observed interlock, which takes on a value of 1 when an interlock exists between two merging firms and 0 otherwise.  Absolute value 
of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table is presented as a robustness 
check for the results presented in Panels A, C, E of Table 22a. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
Interlock 0.032 0.023 
 (1.62) (0.97) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.97)  
Diversified  0.026 
  (1.35) 
Cash  0.013 
  (0.72) 
%Toehold  0.026 
  (0.24) 
Constant -0.018 -0.027 
 (2.04)** (2.53)** 
Observations 118 118 
R-squared 0.03 0.04 
 
Panel B: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
Interlock -0.002 0.053 
 (0.03) (0.88) 
Relative Size 0.002  
 (0.15)  
Diversified  -0.065 
  (1.34) 
Cash  -0.037 
  (0.79) 
%Toehold  -0.438 
  (1.54) 
Constant 0.155 0.182 
 (5.38)*** (6.52)*** 
Observations 118 119 
R-squared 0.00 0.04 
 
Panel C: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(-1,+1) CAR(-1,+1) 
Interlock 0.019 0.023 
 (1.19) (1.23) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (1.19)  
Diversified  -0.002 
  (0.13) 
Cash  -0.018 
  (1.27) 
%Toehold  -0.036 
  (0.41) 
Constant 0.021 0.026 
 (3.08)*** (3.02)*** 
Observations 237 238 




Table 23a: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (0,+60).  For 
Panels A, C, E the model used is                                                      , where P(Interlocked) is the 
calculated likelihood of an interlock, defined as                                                                          
                           .                                                                , for panels B, D, and 
F where P(Surprise Interlock) is equal to the observed interlock (0 or 1) minus P(Interlock).  Absolute value of z-statistics in 
parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Interlock) 0.230 0.137 
 (1.22) (0.66) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.32)  
Diversified  0.011 
  (0.20) 
Cash  0.026 
  (0.46) 
%Toehold  0.287 
  (1.01) 
Constant -0.096 -0.098 
 (2.28)** (2.22)** 
Observations 114 114 
R-squared 0.01 0.03 
Panel B: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.052 0.007 
 (0.85) (0.10) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.49)  
Diversified  0.014 
  (0.24) 
Cash  0.036 
  (0.67) 
%Toehold  0.316 
  (1.03) 
Constant -0.054 -0.077 
 (2.30)** (2.46)** 
Observations 114 114 
R-squared 0.01 0.02 
 
Panel C: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Interlock) -0.114 -0.090 
 (0.47) (0.32) 
Relative Size 0.029  
 (0.96)  
Diversified  -0.032 
  (0.35) 
Cash  -0.069 
  (0.79) 
%Toehold  0.078 
  (0.16) 
Constant 0.186 0.232 
 (2.51)** (3.18)*** 
Observations 114 115 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
Panel D: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.116 0.114 
 (1.14) (1.04) 
Relative Size 0.034  
 (1.13)  
Diversified  -0.037 
  (0.41) 
Cash  -0.080 
  (0.94) 
%Toehold  -0.176 
  (0.37) 
Constant 0.158 0.226 
 (3.30)*** (4.41)*** 
Observations 114 115 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
 
Panel E: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Interlock) 0.275 0.263 
 (2.36)** (2.01)** 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.49)  
Diversified  -0.013 
  (0.32) 
Cash  -0.003 
  (0.09) 
%Toehold  0.045 
  (0.22) 
Constant -0.065 -0.062 
 (2.24)** (2.01)** 
Observations 228 229 
R-squared 0.03 0.02 
Panel F: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
P(Surprise Interlock) 0.071 0.048 
 (1.63) (1.00) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.76)  
Diversified  -0.013 
  (0.34) 
Cash  0.015 
  (0.40) 
%Toehold  0.086 
  (0.40) 
Constant -0.008 -0.015 
 (0.48) (0.66) 
Observations 228 229 
R-squared 0.01 0.01 
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Table 23b: OLS regression of Acquirer, Target, Portfolio Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CARs & P.CARs) for window (0,+60).  For 
Panels A, B, C the model used is                                                     , where Interlocked is the 
observed interlock, which takes on a value of 1 when an interlock exists between two merging firms and 0 otherwise.  Absolute value 
of z-statistics in parentheses; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. This table is presented as a robustness 
check for the results presented in Panels A, C, E of Table 23a. 
 
Panel A: Acquirer CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
Interlock 0.075 0.030 
 (1.32) (0.45) 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.54)  
Diversified  0.010 
  (0.18) 
Cash  0.025 
  (0.48) 
%Toehold  0.292 
  (0.93) 
Constant -0.074 -0.084 
 (2.94)*** (2.71)*** 
Observations 119 119 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
 
Panel B: Target CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
Interlock 0.082 0.093 
 (0.89) (0.86) 
Relative Size 0.028  
 (1.14)  
Diversified  -0.016 
  (0.19) 
Cash  -0.069 
  (0.84) 
%Toehold  -0.220 
  (0.43) 
Constant 0.141 0.196 
 (2.83)*** (3.95)*** 
Observations 118 119 
R-squared 0.02 0.01 
 
Panel C: Portfolio P.CARs 
 (1) (2) 
 CAR(0,+60) CAR(0,+60) 
Interlock 0.094 0.082 
 (2.37)** (1.74)* 
Relative Size -0.000  
 (0.83)  
Diversified  -0.012 
  (0.31) 
Cash  0.005 
  (0.14) 
%Toehold  -0.006 
  (0.03) 
Constant -0.029 -0.029 
 (1.67)* (1.32) 
Observations 237 238 
R-squared 0.02 0.02 
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Figures & Graphs 
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 Shaded for National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) designated U.S. recession 
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